Applying Disparate Impact Theory to Subjective Employee Selection Procedures by Jones, Susan Melanie
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Law Reviews
1-1-1987
Applying Disparate Impact Theory to Subjective
Employee Selection Procedures
Susan Melanie Jones
This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and
Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Susan M. Jones, Applying Disparate Impact Theory to Subjective Employee Selection Procedures, 20 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 375 (1987).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol20/iss2/4
APPLYING DISPARATE IMPACT THEORY TO
SUBJECTIVE EMPLOYEE SELECTION
PROCEDURES
I. INTRODUCTION
Congress rendered race, color, religion, sex and national origin in-
visible to employers in 1965, when Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 took effect.' The central provisions of Title VII make it unlawful to
base hiring or any subsequent employment decision on these protected
characteristics. 2 To enforce Title VII, Congress established the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),3 vesting it with author-
ity to issue administrative regulations, 4 investigate unlawful employment
practice charges, mediate disputes and institute civil actions in district
court when mediation fails.' The Department of Justice may also bring
suit in certain circumstances.6 If the EEOC and the Department of Jns-
1. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1982)). The key provisions of Title VII became effective July 2,
1965, one year after enactment of the entire Act. Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 716(a), 78 Stat. 253,
266 (1964).
2. Title VII establishes that:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to dis-
criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment op-
portunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982).
3. Id. § 2000e-4.
4. Id. § 2000e-12. See infra text accompanying notes 80-94.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. "If the Commission determines... that there is reasonable cause
to believe that the charge is true, the Commission shall endeavor to eliminate any such alleged
unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persua-
sion." Id. § 2000e-5(b). "If ... unable to secure ... a conciliation agreement . . . , the
Commission may bring a civil action." Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
6. Title VII states in pertinent part: "In the case of a respondent which is a government,
governmental agency, or political subdivision.... the Attorney General... may bring a civil
action against such respondent in the appropriate United States district court." Id. § 2000e-
5(f)(1).
The Department of Justice's pre-1972 authority in system-wide pattern or practice cases
reads as follows:
Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that any person or
group of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoy-
ment of any of the rights secured by this subchapter [title VII], and that the pattern
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tice decide not to pursue legal action, Title VII complainants may sue on
their own behalf in district court.7
Since 1965, federal courts have decided thousands of Title VII law-
suits.8 Courts analyze Title VII cases using two major theories formu-
lated by the Supreme Court-disparate treatment and disparate impact.9
Disparate treatment is a motivation-based theory; it requires proof of dis-
criminatory intent to support a finding of unlawful discrimination.10
Courts typically use disparate treatment to analyze cases involving overt
discrimination, for example, where a company publicly refuses to hire
Catholics;" pretextual discrimination, where a complainant charges un-
or practice is ... intended to deny the full exercise of the rights herein described, the
Attorney General may bring a civil action ....
Id. § 2000e-6(a).
Effective March 24, 1972, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission took over the
Department of Justice's pattern-or-practice responsibilities. Id. § 2000e-6(d), (e). In 1978,
President Jimmy Carter issued a reorganization plan clarifying, inter alia, the Attorney Gen-
eral's authority to institute legal action in pattern or practice situations involving public em-
ployers. Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978, § 5, 43 Fed. Reg. 19,807, reprinted in 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-4.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). If the Commission dismisses an unlawful employment
charge, or if within 180 days from the filing date there is no conciliation agreement and neither
the EEOC nor the Department of Justice has initiated legal action, the affected enforcement
agency sends the complainant a "right-to-sue" letter. The complainant has 90 days to file a
civil action after receiving the letter. Id.
8. From 1973 through 1980, there were 35,440 employment discrimination lawsuits filed
in United States District Courts, an average of 5,062 per year. UNITED STATES COURTS,
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE, 1980 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 70. In the meantime,
the EEOC received a staggering volume of Title VII complaints. The charges received,
rounded to the nearest thousand, were 33,000 in 1974, 66,000 in 1975 and 54,000 in 1983.
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT 36 (1973);
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N TENTH ANNUAL REPORT: A DECADE OF
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 54 (1976); EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMM'N, 18TH ANNUAL REPORT 12 (1984).
9. See generally United States Postal Serv. Bd. v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713 n.1 (1983)
(disparate treatment and disparate impact cases consistently distinguished); Texas Dep't of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252 n.5 (1981) (factual issues and pattern of
proof differ according to whether plaintiff claims disparate impact or disparate treatment);
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 n.15 (1977) (disparate
impact claims involve facially neutral practices that fall more harshly on protected groups;
disparate treatment requires proof of discriminatory motive; either theory may apply to given
set of facts); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 n.14 (1973) (disparate
impact theory inappropriate where man disqualified for rehire due to participation in illegal
act against company).
10. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 807. To prove discrimination under the disparate
treatment theory, the complainant had to prove that his former employer's "assigned reason
for refusing to re-employ was a pretext or discriminatory in its application." Id.
11. See, e.g., Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (rule barring employ-
ment of women with pre-school age children invalidated); Boykin v. Georgia-Pacific Corp.,
706 F.2d 1384 (5th Cir. 1983) (black mill employees succeeded in proving disparate treatment
violation where nearly all blacks held lowest level jobs; plant manager testified blacks were
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fair treatment but the employer denies wrongful motivation;1 2 and sys-
temic discrimination, where a "pattern or practice" of unfair treatment is
so pervasive that discriminatory intent may be inferred.13
Unlike the disparate treatment theory, the disparate impact theory
does not require proof of improper intent to sustain a Title VII viola-
tion.14 Disparate impact analysis is result-oriented, focusing on facially
neutral employment practices that fall more harshly on members of
groups protected by Title VI 15
The Supreme Court first articulated the disparate impact theory in
Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,16 a 1971 race discrimination case. In Griggs,
the Court found that use of standardized tests violated Title VII because
the tests screened out a significantly larger proportion of blacks than
whites (hence the later adopted term "disparate impact"). 7 Although
Griggs involved objective tests, the Court's conclusion that lawful intent
"does not redeem employment procedures ... or testing mechanisms"'
18
may be interpreted to mean that any employment procedure, objective or
subjective, can violate Title VII if it has a disproportionate, adverse effect
on women or minorities. 9 In Griggs, the Supreme Court did not define
the term "employment procedures," nor has it subsequently identified
happier in easy jobs with little responsibility), cert denied, 465 U.S. 1006 (1984); Gerdom v.
Continental Airlines, 692 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1982) (weight requirements for female flight at-
tendants unlawful), cert. dismissed, 460 U.S. 1074 (1983).
12. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 801 (complainant alleged he was denied rehire due to
civil rights activities, but the employer denied any discrimination).
13. Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 303 (1977) (pattern or practice
of discrimination found where school district had history of racial prejudice, hired first black
teacher in 1969, was accused of 55 specific instances of discrimination, used standardless hiring
policies, and exhibited "gross" statistical disparity in black hiring rates compared to pool of
qualified black teachers in the area); Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 337 (system-wide pattern or prac-
tice of discrimination found where black and Hispanic employees were historically excluded
and, by 1969, still grossly underrepresented in desirable "line driver" jobs).
14. Aikens, 460 U.S. at 713 n.1; Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 328-29 (1977);
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1971).
15. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432. "[P]ractices, procedures or tests neutral on their face, and
even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo
of prior discriminatory employment practices." Id. at 430.
Though an employer's intent is honorable, its procedures may nonetheless operate to ex-
clude or hinder progress of protected group members, hence causing disparate impact. See
Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 583 (1978) (Marshall, J., dissenting in part).
16. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
17. Id. at 429, 431.
18. Id. at 432.
19. In Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2357 (1985),
the court interpreted Griggs broadly, emphasizing that the purpose of Title VII is "not well
served" by "permit[ting] challenges only to readily perceptible barriers.. . . 'It is abundantly
clear that Title VII tolerates no discrimination, subtle or otherwise.'" Id. at 1271-72, 1288
n.34 (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973)).
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the limits of disparate impact analysis. While the Court has employed
disparate impact analysis to examine objective selection criteria such as
height/weight minimums and non-drug-use requirements, the applicabil-
ity of disparate impact analysis to subjective selection procedures re-
mains undecided.
Lacking explicit Supreme Court guidance, the circuit and district
courts have arrived at contradictory answers to the questions of whether
and how to apply disparate impact theory to subjective selection proce-
dures such as interviews and performance appraisals.2" Courts opposing
disparate impact analysis of subjective procedures argue that such analy-
sis places an unreasonable burden of justification on the employer.2,
Conversely, courts favoring disparate impact analysis of subjective proce-
dures contend that refusal to use such analysis hampers the achievement
of Title VII's purpose. 2
The purpose of Title VII is to eliminate unlawful discrimination in
employment.2 3 Currently, the statute is understood to prohibit both in-
tentional and unintentional discrimination.24 This view is based on the
belief that discimination is often so deeply ingrained in employment sys-
tems that its presence goes unrecognized.2" People who make subjective
employment decisions may, without intending to do so, perpetuate dis-
criminatory patterns.
This Comment explores the issues of whether and how the non-
motivational disparate impact theory may apply to subjective proce-
dures.26 Parts I and II review Title VII's legislative history and outline
20. Id. at 1271 (application of disparate impact model to non-specific employment prac-
tices does not place unreasonable burden on employer, notwithstanding fears expressed by
Pouncy court); Pouncy v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 668 F.2d 795, 801 (5th Cir. 1982) (plain-
tiff's failure to isolate variables causing racial imbalance barred application of disparate impact
model).
21. See infra text accompanying notes 181-83.
22. Segar, 738 F.2d at 1271; see also infra note 199 for the circuits following the Segar
court's view.
23. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2355, 2401. There was no conference committee to report on the 1964 civil
rights bill. Therefore, the only complete source of legislative history for the bill as enacted is
the thousands of pages of debate recorded in the Congressional Record.
24. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 447 n.8 (1982) (legislative history of 1972 amend-
ments demonstrates that Congress approved the non-motivational, disparate impact approach
of Griggs); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763 (1976) (Title VII prohibits all
practices that cause employment inequality, regardless of form); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973) (requirement of racially neutral personnel decisions bars all
racial discrimination, subtle or overt).
25. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1137, 2143-44; S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1971).
26. "An important question on which there has been considerable confusion is whether the
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relevant portions of the EEOC administrative guidelines. Part III sum-
marizes Supreme Court cases that have framed the standards for dispa-
rate impact analysis, then sets forth two court of appeals decisions
adopting diametrically opposite positions concerning the scope of dispa-
rate impact. Part IV analyzes practical and policy issues raised by apply-
ing disparate impact theory to subjective selection procedures and then
proposes guidelines for examining subjective procedures under disparate
impact theory. Finally, part V concludes that extending disparate im-
pact analysis to subjective procedures is advisable because the benefits
gained in advancing the purpose of Title VII outweigh the difficulties
associated with a complex analysis.
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLE VII
A. Roots of Title VII
Although Congress enacted Title VII under the authority of the
commerce clause,27 the philosophical roots of equal employment oppor-
tunity law lie in the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause.2 8
The nation's first civil rights acts emerged during the post Civil War Re-
Griggs-Moody validation requirements apply to selection procedures other than the kind of
objective tests and educational requirements actually involved in those cases." 3 A. LARSON &
L. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 76.30, at 15-81 (1986). Larson and Larson
contend that the Griggs-Moody model should be limited to objective selection criteria. Id.
27. 110 CONG. REc. 7209 (1964). Then-Deputy Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach
issued a Department of Justice opinion stating that, "We believe that the commerce clause of
the Constitution (art. I, see. 8) provides authority for Congress to enact fair employment prac-
tices legislation." Id.
28. In 1857, a slim Supreme Court majority held that slaves, who counted as 3/5 of a
person for apportionment purposes, were not "citizens" of the United States, and therefore
could not claim the privileges and immunities of citizens. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393
(19 How. 1857).
After the Civil War, Congress enacted the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amend-
ments, abolishing slavery and establishing the entitlement of all citizens to due process of law,
equal protection of the law and freedom from state interference with their federal citizenship
privileges. U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, XV.
In 1964, Senator Joseph Clark (D-Pa.), one of two Senate floor leaders supporting Title
VII, explained that the commerce clause provided enabling authority, while the equal protec-
tion clause provided the underlying purpose for Title VII:
[Title VII] would establish a legislative civil right for what has always been a sacred
American constitutional right, the right to equal protection of the laws.... [T]he
philosophy behind [the equal protection clause] ... is the philosophy behind the fair
employment practice title.
It merely says, "When you deal in interstate commerce, you must not discrimi-
nate on the basis of race, religion, color, national origin, or sex."
110 CONG. REC. 13,080 (1964).
In Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964), the Supreme Court
asserted that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was based on both the fourteenth amendment and
the commerce clause. Id. at 249.
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construction era; they were enacted under the enabling authority of the
fourteenth amendment. 29 Their key provisions guaranteed to everyone
the same right to contract as white people enjoyed (this provision has
survived as Section 198 1),30 barred discrimination under color of state
law (now Section 1983),31 and promised equal access to public accommo-
dations. 2 However, the Supreme Court severely curtailed congressional
authority to enact civil rights legislation in the 1883 Civil Rights Cases.
33
The Court determined that Congress had exceeded its fourteenth amend-
ment authority by enacting laws defining the amendment's scope, 34 and
that the amendment only prohibited state action.35 Following that nar-
row interpretation of the fourteenth amendment's enacting authority,
eighty-two years elapsed before Congress passed another civil rights
law.
36
29. Congress enacted the nation's first civil rights acts in 1866, 1870, 1871 and 1875. M.
KoNvITz, THE CONSTITUTION AND CIVIL RIGHTS 3-7 (1947).
30. Part of the 1866 Act, now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982), provides basically that
people of all races shall have the same rights to make contracts, to sue, and to enjoy protection
of the laws for personal security, as white citizens.
31. The 1871 Act, now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), prohibits discriminatory acts
under color of state law.
32. Civil Rights Act of 1875, 18 Stat. 335 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 44-45) (repealed 1948).
See also KoNvrrz, supra note 29, at 6.
33. 109 U.S. 3 (1883); see also Senate discussion of public accommodations provision in
1964 Civil Rights Act, 110 CONG. REc. 10,380-82 (1964).
34. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 14-15.
35. Id. at 11, 13. The Court again constricted the application of the fourteenth amend-
ment equal protection clause in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). The Plessy majority
held that a Louisiana statute requiring racial separation on intrastate railway cars was consti-
tutional under a reasonableness standard. Id. at 548, 550-51. The Court determined that a
state "is at liberty to act with reference to the established usages, customs and traditions of the
people, and with a view to the promotion of their comfort" to determine what is "reasonable."
Id. at 550. The majority asserted that the absolute equality required by the fourteenth amend-
ment meant political equality and "could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based
on color, or to enforce ... a commingling of the two races." Id. at 544. The Plessy dissent
foreshadowed the view adopted 50 years hence: "Our Constitution is color-blind.... The thin
disguise of 'equal' accommodations for passengers in railroad coaches will not mislead any
one, nor atone for the wrong this day done." Id. at 559, 562 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
36. 1959 REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS iX-X [hereinaf-
ter 1959 REPORTS]. Congress stepped tentatively onto once-treacherous ground by enacting
the Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634. That Act created a fact-finding
commission to investigate voting rights violations and to make recommendations regarding
federal legislation enforcing the equal protection clause. Id. § 104(a)(l)-(3), 71 Stat. 634, 635
(1957).
Members of Congress introduced fair employment practices legislation at every session
between 1944 and 1963. Vaas, Title VII. Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV,
431, 431 (1966). However, all of the bills died in committee or in Senate filibusters. Id.
Before the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the only federal law unambiguously prohibiting pri-
vate employment discrimination was an Executive Order covering government contractors. IN
FREEDOM'S VANGUARD: NAACP REPORT FOR 1963 71 (1964) [hereinafter NAACP RE-
January 1987] DISPARATE IMPACT THEORY
Sections 1981 and 1983, the surviving portions of the Reconstruc-
tion civil rights acts, 37 and the equal protection clause itself, formed the
major bases for employment discrimination actions before 1965.38 Even
after the advent of Title VII, some discrimination plaintiffs continue to
plead their cases alternatively under these theories.39 However, Sections
1981 and 1983, and the equal protection clause, present two serious limi-
tations for people alleging employment discrimination. First, federal
courts generally require purposeful discrimination to support a finding of
liability under these theories.' Second, these theories typically only pro-
PORT]. But that order had limited effectiveness. "The great majority of breakthroughs [due to
the executive order] involved only a limited number of Negroes and was mainly token or
symbolic in nature with no significant extension to the industrial labor force." Id.
37. See supra notes 30-31.
38. See, e.g., Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941) (black pullman por-
ters challenged a Texas law under the equal protection clause because it required a conductor
on every sleeping car; all conductors were white, so the law arguably denied blacks an equal
opportunity to work); Brooks v. School Dist., 267 F.2d 733 (8th Cir.) (non-rehiring of all black
teachers during school desegregation was challenged, without success, under the equal protec-
tion clause and §§ 1981 & 1983), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 894 (1959); Morris v. Williams, 149
F.2d 703 (8th Cir. 1945) (Little Rock School District's unwritten yet consistent policy of pay-
ing black teachers less than whites violated § 1983); Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library, 149
F.2d 212 (4th Cir.) (court found violations of §§ 1981, 1983 and equal protection clause in
quasi-public library's discriminatory refusal to admit qualified black woman to training pro-
gram), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 721 (1945).
39. See, e.g., General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375 (1982) (action
claiming race discrimination in hiring hall practices brought under Title VII and § 1981);
Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (woman challenged Massachusetts veterans'
preference statute, which had adverse effect on hiring of women, under fourteenth amendment
and § 1983); Long v. Ford Motor Co., 496 F.2d 500 (6th Cir. 1974) (Title VII and § 1981
coexist; complainant need not wait for end of EEOC administrative procedure, or file EEOC
complaint at all, in order to bring action under § 1981).
40. The leading case establishing the requirement of intent in non-Title VII discrimination
cases is Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (fifth and fourteenth amendments
require proof of discriminatory purpose to support finding of race discrimination by govern-
ment employer). See also General Bldg. Contractors.Ass'n, 458 U.S. at 391 (section 1981 action
for race discrimination requires proof of purposeful discrimination); Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279
(discriminatory intent, defined narrowly as continuing an action "because of" rather than "in
spite of" adverse impact, required to prove case under fourteenth amendment and § 1983);
Thompson v. School Dist., 623 F.2d 46, 48 (8th Cir. 1980) (plaintiff must prove discriminatory
intent under § 1983); Marshall v. Kirkland, 602 F.2d 1282, 1283 (8th Cir. 1979) (plaintiff must
prove discriminatory intent in actions brought under § 1983).
However, there is still some dispute in the courts as to whether intent is required in a
§ 1981 case. See, eg., Williams v. DeKalb County, 582 F.2d 2, 2-3 (5th Cir. 1978) (must prove
discriminatory intent); Kinsey v. First Regional Sec., Inc., 557 F.2d 830, 838 n.22 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (court stated in dicta that § 1981 plaintiff need not meet Constitutional intent standard).
For a discussion of the § 1981 intent issue, see Comment, Section 1981 and Employment Test-
ing: Discriminatory Impact Establishes a Prima Facie Case, 19 URB. L. ANN. 268, 275 (1980).
Even in a Title VII disparate impact suit, the Supreme Court has ruled that discrimina-
tory intent is required to invalidate a pre-1965 seniority system, even if maintaining the system
perpetuates discrimination. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 277 (1982).
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:375
hibit discrimination involving state action.4 Therefore, parties injured
by unintentional discrimination, or by private employer discrimination,
find their sole federal remedies under Title VII.42
B. History of Title VII and the 1972 Amendments
Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 after a year of sub-
committee hearings, drafts, amendments and protracted debate in the
Senate. 43 Contemporary commentators-including opponents-agreed
that the new law created a revolutionary mandate for equality in employ-
ment opportunities, public accommodation, education and other essen-
tial areas.'
The racial unrest of the early 1960s had made the country ripe for
major civil rights legislation, as blacks began demanding their full rights
and privileges as citizens.45 In June 1963, following a march-turned-riot
41. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 754 (1966) (equal protection clause applies to
states and those acting under their authority); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (four-
teenth amendment does not prohibit private invasion of rights). But see Sale v. Waverly-Shell
Rock Bd. of Educ., 390 F. Supp. 784, 787 (D.C. Iowa 1975) (fourteenth amendment gives
Congress power to prohibit private discrimination) (citing Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S.
641 (1966)).
42. The exception is § 1981, which has been held to apply to private as well as public
discrimination in employment. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459-
60 (1975); Young v. International Tel. & Tel. Co., 438 F.2d 757, 759 (3d Cir. 1971) (because
origin of § 1981 was the Civil Rights Act of 1866, based on thirteenth rather than fourteenth
amendment enacting authority, § 1981 encompasses private acts of discrimination, while
§ 1983 and the equal protection clause only reach governmental discrimination). For detailed
discussion of § 1981 as a cause of action for private employment discrimination, see Larson,
The Development of§ 1981 as a Remedy for Racial Discrimination in Private Employment, 7
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 56 (1972).
43. 110 CONG. REc. 15,897 (1964). Vaas, supra note 36, at 434, 457.
44. Schmidt, Title VII: Coverage and Comments, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 459
(1966). Title VII "broaden[s] the possible area of government intervention in the personnel
policies of American employers to an extent unmatched by any Federal statute since the Wag-
ner Act." Id. (citing Kheel, The Impact of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 16 Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) at E-1 (Jan. 26, 1965)). Title VII "constitutes a regulatory device ... of
immense proportions." Id. (citing Civil Rights Act of 1964, NATIONAL A. MANUFACTURERS
L. DEP'T REV. (1964)).
45. That [Negro] revolution ... has burst out of the South to engulf the North.... It
has seared the white conscience-even while, in some of its excesses, it has created
bitterness .... And right up to the President of the U.S., it has forced white politi-
cians who have long cashed in on their lip service to "civil rights" to put up or shut
up.
The Nation: The Negro Revolution to Date, TIME, Aug. 30, 1963, at 9.
The economic situation of many American blacks gave them added impetus to seek new
civil rights legislation. From 1953-63, the median income for black families decreased from
57% to 53% of white family income. Id. at 13.
The NAACP reported that: "What was dramatically altered in 1963 was the temper of
the American Negro and the attitude of the white majority. The ferment in the Negro commu-
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in Birmingham, Alabama, President John F. Kennedy sent a message to
Congress requesting new civil rights legislation.46 The President stressed
the need to include provisions improving minority employment
opportunities:
Unemployment falls with special cruelty on minority groups.
The unemployment rate of Negro workers is more than twice
as high as that of the working force as a whole .... Delin-
quency, vandalism, . . . and the high cost of public welfare are
all directly related to unemployment ....
[R]acial discrimination in employment must be eliminated:
Denial of the right to work is unfair regardless of its victim. It
is doubly unfair to throw its burden on an individual because of
his race or color.4
Several committees in the House of Representatives were already consid-
ering civil rights bills before President Kennedy's message.4" The admin-
istration's comprehensive bill, introduced one day after the President's
message, was combined with key provisions of related bills and replaced
twice with substitute amendments before it passed the House.49
The equal employment provisions of the Civil Rights Act comprise
Title VII. 5° As reported by its original authors in the House Judiciary
Committee, Title VII was designed "to eliminate, through... formal and
informal remedial procedures, discrimination in employment based on
race, color, religion, or national origin."51 The House added a prohibi-
nity was indicative of this changed mood. It signified an end to group patience in the struggle
to abolish discrimination." NAACP REPORT, supra note 36, at 8.
46. 109 CONG. Rc. 11,174 (1963), reprinted in 1963 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS,
1526.
47. 109 CONG. REC. 11,177-78 (1963), reprinted in 1963 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS, 1530, 1533.
48. Vaas, supra note 36, at 433.
49. Id. at 435. In the House Judiciary Committee, the bill-H.R. 7152-was wholly re-
written as an amendment in the form of a substitute bill. Disgruntled committee members
filed a minority report, asserting that proponents railroaded their substitute bill through the
committee almost without discussion:
This legislation is the most radical proposal in the field of civil rights ever recom-
mended by any committee of the House or Senate. It was drawn in secret meetings
held between certain members of this committee, the Attorney General and members
of his staff and certain select persons, to the exclusion of other committee members.
H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 2355, 2431.
50. See supra note 2.
51. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d. Sess. 2, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 2355, 2401.
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tion against sex-based discrimination as an amendment.
5 2
Another essential purpose of Title VII was the establishment of a
uniform, nationwide fair employment law.13 The House Judiciary Com-
mittee explained that the uniformity goal applied to the entire Civil
Rights Act: "H.R. 7152 ... is designed as a step toward eradicating
significant areas of discrimination on a nationwide basis. It is general in
application and national in scope."54 Senator Joseph Clark (D-Pa.), one
of two floor managers supporting Title VII, asserted that federal fair em-
ployment legislation law was essential because state and local laws were
sometimes ineffective-and nonexistent where most needed: "[E]ffective
enforcement is hampered by inadequate legislation, inadequate proce-
dures, or an inadequate budget. Big interstate industry cannot effectively
be handled by the States."55 During the sixty-six day Senate filibuster on
the Civil Rights Bill,56 senators proposed more than 500 amendments to
the House-approved version 57 and rewrote the entire bill twice."
A key issue during Senate debate was whether the law should ex-
pressly require discriminatory intent to support a Title VII violation. 59
Title VII opponents demanded inclusion of specific language requiring
52. 110 CONG. REC. 2577-84, 2718, 2720-21 (1964). Vaas, supra note 36, at 439. A noted
opponent of civil rights legislation, Representative Howard Smith (D-Va.) offered the sex
amendment as a joke, referring to a letter from a female seeking to find out what Congress
planned to do about the fact that American women outnumber American men. Id. at 441-42.
53. In 1964, 28 states and 48 cities had fair employment practices laws, which varied
widely in scope and effectiveness. 110 CONG. REc. 13,080 (1964). No states of the Old South
had fair employment laws in 1964, and 60% of the non-white population lived in the 22 states
lacking employment discrimination laws. Id.
54. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2355, 2393.
55. 110 CONG. Rac. 13,080 (1964). Relatively few cases were pursued under pre-Title VII
state and local fair employment laws, "and the overall impact on personnel practice [was]
almost nil except for the fact that certain questions on ... employment applications were
eliminated." M. MINER & J. MINER, EMPLOYEE SELECTION WITHIN THE LAW 4 (1979).
56. 110 CONG. REc. 14,480 (1964) (recapitulation of events leading to passage of the Civil
Rights Act, contained in final edition of Bipartisan Civil Rights Newsletter).
Senator Robert Byrd (D-W. Va.) lamented the inability of opposition Senators to block
the cloture vote, which ended the filibuster and brought the Act to a vote: "Senate rules which
provide for unlimited debate--call it filibuster if you will-constitute the final weapon pos-
sessed by a minority of States for their protection against a temporary and tyrannical major-
ity." Id.
57. Id.
58. Vaas, supra note 36, at 445-46. The two substitute bills were the product of extensive
behind-the-scenes coordination among Senate and House leaders, the Attorney General and
administration representatives. Id.
59. For example, Senator Sam Ervin (D-N.C.) attacked Title VII as a "thought control
bill," asserting that an employer could be "judged guilty or innocent on the basis of the con-
tents of his mind at the time he commits the act, because discrimination is a mental process."
110 CONG. REC. 13,078 (1964). Senator Ervin further predicted that the bill would rob em-
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discriminatory purpose, while proponents argued that such language was
unnecessary and redundant.6" Some Senators feared that the new law
would ban any employment test that had the unintended effect of dis-
criminating against minorities.61 To allay detractors' fears and clarify
the law's reach, the Senate added amendments specifying that only un-
lawful employment practices intentionally engaged in could be en-
joined,62 and that use of "professionally developed ability tests" would be
permitted as long as the tests were not designed or used to discriminate.63
Senator Clark explained that the amended bill meant employment tests
would only be unlawful if they were "used for the purpose of discriminat-
ing against an individual because of his race, color, religion, sex or na-
tional origin .... []t is not enough that the effect of using a particular
test is to favor one group above another, to produce a violation of the
act... ."' Senator Hubert Humphrey (D-Minn.), one of the chief pro-
ployers of the right to run their own businesses "in any case where a federal bureaucrat or a
federal court rules that they were actuated by any racial motive." Id.
For similarly lively discussions of intent, see 110 CONG. Rac. 7036, 7253-55 (1964).
60. Senator John Tower (R-Tex.) proposed an amendment allowing employers to use pro-
fessionally developed tests even if such tests had the unintended effect of discriminating against
"culturally deprived or disadvantaged groups." 110 CONG. REc. 13,492 (1964). The Senate
approved a rephrased version of Senator Tower's amendment. 110 CONG. Rc. 13,724 (1964).
However, Title VII proponents believed that the amendment was only a clarifying change, not
a substantive one. See infra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
Accepting proponents' interpretation of the intent requirement, Senator John Williams
(D-Del.) said he would vote for Title VII as amended because "no employer can be held re-
sponsible for any violation, unless it can be proved.., intentional." 110 CONG. REc. 14,331
(1964).
61. Title VII opponents wanted to ensure that federal law did not have the same effect as
the Illinois decision, Motorola, Inc. v. Illinois Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, 51 Lab.
Cas. (CCH) § 51,323 (Ill. Cir. 1963), which invalidated tests with unintended discriminatory
effects. 110 CONG. REc. 13,492-505 (1964).
62. That amendment, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982), provides in part: "If the
court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an
unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the court may enjoin the respondent
63. The test amendment, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1982), provides:
[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to ... give and to
act upon the results of any professionally developed ability test provided that such
test, its administration or action upon the results is not designed, intended or used to
discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
64. 110 CONG. REC. 14,468 (1964). In a letter to the editor of the Wall Street Journal,
Senator Clark emphasized that Title VII should be interpreted to exclude tests given in good
faith. However, Clark asserted that he and the other members of the Labor and Public Wel-
fare Committee thought Title VII should cover tests with unintended discriminatory results:
"I believe that the situation presented in the Motorola case should be covered by Federal law.
But whatever my preferences, and those of my colleagues .... the issues [of ostensibly nondis-
criminatory tests] ... have nothing to do with Title VII... and are plainly beyond its scope."
Id.
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ponents of the civil rights bill, observed that the amendment limiting in-
junctions to intentional violators only reinforced the implicit meaning of
the bill.
Since the title bars only discrimination because of race, color,
religion, sex or natural [sic] origin it would seem already to
require intent, and, thus, the proposed change does not involve
any substantive change.... The express requirement of intent
is designed to make it wholly clear that inadvertent or acciden-
tal discriminations will not violate the title .... 65
Thus, when Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII
was generally understood to prohibit only intentional employment
discrimination.
66
By 1971, when Congress began considering major amendments to
Title VII in the form of an Equal Employment Opportunity Act,67 many
senators and representatives had changed their thinking about the nature
of job discrimination, whom it affected, and how to eradicate it.68 The
Senate and House committee reports recommending the 1972 legislation
rejected the prevalent 1964 view that employment discrimination is a
"series of distinguishable events, due, for the most part, to ill-will on the
part of some identifiable individual or organization."69 Instead, the com-
mittees determined that job discrimination is a complex and pervasive
phenomenon, better described "in terms of 'systems' and 'effects' rather
than simply intentional wrongs."' 70 The committees concluded that iden-
tifying discrimination is no easy task,7 1 and eliminating it is even more
65. Id. at 12,723-24. Richard Berg, a Justice Department attorney in 1964, concluded that
the effect of the word "intentionally" in the statute was questionable-if it had any effect at all:
Discrimination is by its nature intentional. It involves both an action and a reason
for the action. To discriminate "unintentionally" on grounds of race, color, religion,
sex or national origin appears a contradiction in terms.
If the Amendment... exempts such [subconscious, therefore unintentional] discrim-
ination, the loss is hardly significant since such discrimination would be well-nigh
impossible to prove.
Berg, Equal Employment Opportunity Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 62, 71 & n.14 (1964) (footnote omitted).
66. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
67. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103, (codi-
fied as amendments to and deletions from 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1982)). The 1972 Act
was passed under the authority of the fourteenth amendment, without reliance on the com-
merce clause. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 447-48 (1976).
68. H.R. RaP. No. 238, supra note 25, at 2143-44; S. REP. No. 415, supra note 25, at 5.
69. H.R. RP. No. 238, supra note 25, at 2144; S. REP. No. 415, supra note 25, at 5.
70. S. REP. No. 415, supra note 25, at 4.
71. H.R. REP. No. 238, supra note 25, at 2144. "It is increasingly obvious that the entire
area of employment discrimination is one whose resolution requires not only expert assistance,
but also the technical perception that a problem exists in the first place . . . ." Id.
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difficult, because "practices and policies of employment discrimination
are so deeply ingrained."72
One of the most critical Title VII issues confronting legislators in
1972 was how to enforce the law more effectively.73 Based on the then-
new assumption that discrimination is difficult to identify because it is
deeply rooted in many employment systems, both committees concluded
that the EEOC needed greater enforcement powers.74 Since 1965, the
EEOC had resolved less than half of the 81,000 charges it had received
through the voluntary conciliation procedure established in 1964.7 ' The
1972 Equal Employment Opportunity Act empowered the EEOC to
bring action in district court if conciliation efforts failed.76
Title VII's key prohibitions-against consideration of protected
characteristics in hiring, firing, promotion and job classification deci-
sions-remained unchanged by the 1972 amendments.7 7 Similarly unal-
tered were the subsections permitting use of ability tests and limiting
injunctions to employers who intentionally engage in an unlawful em-
ployment practice.78  Meanwhile, Supreme Court decisions and the
EEOC procedural regulations (Guidelines) were changing the intent re-
quirement of Title VII.
79
C. Key Provisions of the EEOC Guidelines
Title VII authorizes the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion "from time to time to issue, amend, or rescind suitable procedural
regulations."8 While these regulations lack the force of law, numerous
courts have deferred to them as representing legislative intent.81
72. S. REP. No. 415, supra note 25, at 4.
73. H.R. REP. No. 238, supra note 25, at 2139; S. REP. No. 415, supra note 25, at 1, 4.
74. H.R. REP. No. 238, supra note 25, at 2139; S. REP. No. 411, supra note 25, at 1, 4.
75. S. REP. No. 415, supra note 25, at 5.
76. Pub. L. 92-261 § 4, 86 Stat. 104 (1972), (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1982)).
Other major changes effected by the 1972 Act included extending Title VII coverage to smaller
employers (minimum number of employees was reduced from 25 to 15), non-religious schools
and government employers. Id. §§ 2, 3, 86 Stat. 103 (1972), (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)
and § 2000e-1 (1982)).
77. See generally Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86
Stat. 103 (codified as amendments to and deletions from 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17).
78. The language remained as originally written in 1964. See supra notes 62-63.
79. See supra notes 67-73.
80. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (1982).
81. Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975) (Guidelines entitled to great
deference); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971) (same); Griffin v. Carlin,
755 F.2d 1516, 1525 (11th Cir. 1985) (same). But see General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S.
125, 141 (1976) (Guidelines exceed authority of EEOC to issue "procedural regulations" and
are not contemporaneous with statute-hence not entitled to deference).
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The EEOC issued its first Guidelines on Employment Testing Proce-
dures in 1966.82 Those rules were superseded in 1970 by new Guidelines
on Employee Selection Procedures,83 and again in 1978 by the Uniform
Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures.84 The 1978 Guidelines
were issued jointly by the EEOC, the departments of Justice and Labor,
and the Civil Service Commission."
The 1970 edition of the Guidelines focused mainly on tests, requir-
ing "validation" of any test "which adversely affects hiring, promotion,
transfer or any other employment or membership opportunity of classes
protected by Title VII." 86 To validate a test, an employer had to conduct
a validity study, using procedures generally accepted by the American
Psychological Association to demonstrate that the test predicted or was
significantly correlated to desired work behavior.8 7 A short section enti-
tled "Other Selection Techniques" noted that such procedures as inter-
views and application forms may be discriminatory in use, and gave
employers the choice of validating or eliminating such procedures if they
caused discrimination.88 The brevity of this section, and its separation
from the central "adverse effects" definition of discrimination, suggest
that techniques other than tests were not considered serious problems by
the EEOC.
The 1978 Guidelines expanded the reach of regulations governing
adverse impact, stating that any "[p]rocedure having adverse impact con-
stitutes discrimination unless justified."'89 In addition to tests, the new
regulations applied to any selection procedure, defined to include "the
full range of assessment techniques from traditional paper and pencil
tests... through informal or casual interviews and unscored application
forms."90 Thus, by 1978, the administrative regulations issued by the
agencies chiefly responsible for enforcing Title VII extended the valida-
tion requirements for procedures causing "adverse impact" to the full
range of employment practices. 91
The 1978 Guidelines failed to close one important loophole regard-
ing unscored, subjective procedures. That loophole is an undefined re-
82. These Guidelines were not published in the Federal Register. However, they were
issued by the EEOC on August 24, 1966. 35 Fed. Reg. 12,333 (1970).
83. 35 Fed. Reg. 12,333 (1970) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1607, superseded in 1978).
84. 43 Fed. Reg. 38,295, 38,312 (1978) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (1985)).
85. Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.1,A (1985).
86. Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 35 Fed. Reg. 12,333 (1970).
87. Id. at 12,334.
88. Id. at 12,336.
89. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.3.A (1985).
90. Id. § 1607.16.Q.
91. Id.
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quirement for employers who use informal or unscored selection
procedures with adverse impact. 92 The rule gives such employers three
alternatives to avoid violating Title VII: 1) eliminate the adverse impact;
2) change the procedure to an objective one that can be formally vali-
dated; or 3) "otherwise justify continued use of the procedure. ' 93 How
to "otherwise justify" informal or unscored selection procedures remains
an open question.94
III. DEVELOPMENT OF CASE LAW
A. Supreme Court Decisions
The Supreme Court has designed two models of analysis in Title VII
cases: disparate treatment and disparate impact. Under the disparate
treatment model, the court must find intentional discrimination.9
Under the disparate impact model, the court focuses on the effects of an
employment procedure rather than the employer's intention.96
Title VII plaintiffs may argue their cases under disparate treatment,
disparate impact, or both models.97 Similarly, courts may apply either or
both models in deciding a case.98 A court's choice of model has a signifi-
cant effect on case outcome,99 because the patterns of proof differ sub-
stantially. For example, the defendant's evidentiary burden is heavier in
the disparate impact model, so applying that model increases the plain-
tiff's likelihood of success. 1°° Some courts apply disparate treatment
analysis to fact situations where often other courts would apply disparate
impact analysis; this malleability of facts makes a sound understanding
92. Id. § 1607.6.B.
93. Id.
94. A. LARSON & L. LARSON, supra note 26, § 76.32, at 15-83.
95. See supra note 9.
96. See supra notes 14-15.
97. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). "Either theory
may... be applied to a particular set of facts." Id. at 336 n.15.
98. Courts typically apply the approach they deem most appropriate to the facts. "We
have consistently distinguished disparate-treatment cases from cases involving facially neutral
employment standards that have disparate impact . . . ." United States Postal Serv. Bd. of
Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713 n.1 (1983).
99. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252 n.5 (1981). "[T]he
factual issues, and therefore the character of the evidence presented, differ when the plaintiff
claims that a facially neutral employment policy has a discriminatory impact .. " Id.
100. The ultimate burden of persuasion in disparate treatment remains on the plaintiff at all
times. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253. See also Board of Trustees v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 25 n.2
(1978). On the other hand, in disparate impact, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant
after plaintiff establishes a prima facie showing of discrimination. The employer must prove
"that the challenged requirements are job related." Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329
(1977).
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of disparate treatment necessary to evaluate the proper scope of disparate
impact.
The Supreme Court explained the three-step procedure for disparate
treatment analysis in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 1 I and refined it
in subsequent cases." 2 First, the complainant must establish a prima
facie case of discrimination.10 3 The complainant may meet this prelimi-
nary burden by showing that: 1) he belongs to a protected group;104 2)
he applied for and was objectively qualified for an open job; 3) he was
rejected; and 4) the employer continued to seek additional applicants
with the same qualifications.105 Second, the defendant must rebut the
resulting presumption by articulating a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason" for the rejection. 10 6 The employer's burden, as clarified in Texas
Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,17 is one of production, not
persuasion; the explanation need only raise "a genuine issue of fact" as to
whether the employer discriminated.'0 8 The third step in disparate treat-
ment analysis arises only if defendant has met its intermediary burden by
offering a nondiscriminatory explanation.' 09 At that point, the com-
plainant may introduce evidence showing that the employer's "stated
reason for [complainant's] rejection was in fact pretext [for discrimina-
tion],"' ----in other words, that "a discriminatory reason more likely mo-
tivated the employer.""' At the "pretext" stage, having heard all the
evidence, the court "must decide which party's explanation of the em-
ployer's motivation it believes.""' 2 Throughout the process of disparate
treatment analysis, the ultimate burden of proving the employer's unlaw-
ful motivation is on the plaintiff." 3
101. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
102. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254 (defendant's intermediary burden is one of production, not
proof; defendant's evidence rebuts presumption of intentional discrimination if it "raises a gen-
uine issue of fact" concerning defendant's motive); Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S.
567, 580 (1978) (defendant may introduce broad range of evidence relevant to its motive in
order to rebut plaintiff's prima facie showing).
103. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
104. In McDonnell Douglas, the Court stated that the prima facie case required a showing
that plaintiff "belongs to a racial minority." Id. at 802.
However, the Court has interpreted the McDonnell Douglas proof pattern as a rough
guideline, not a restrictive rule. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253 n.6.
105. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
106. Id.
107. 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981).
108. Id. at 257.
109. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804.
110. Id.
111. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
112. Aikens, 460 U.S. at 716.
113. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
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On the other hand, disparate impact theory places a greater burden
on the party accused of discrimination. 411 In Griggs v. Duke Power
Co. 115 and its progeny,1 16 the Supreme Court established a three-step in-
quiry for disparate impact cases.11 7 First, plaintiff must make a prima
facie showing that a "facially neutral" selection procedure has a dispa-
rate impact on his or her protected group. 8 Second, defendant must
demonstrate that the challenged procedure is job-related or a business
necessity.'" 9 Finally, if defendant succeeds in justifying its procedure,
plaintiff has the opportunity to show that "other tests or selection de-
vices, without a similarly undesirable ... effect, would also serve the
employer's legitimate interest."'
120
In Griggs, a class of black employees successfully argued that the
requirement of a median score on standardized tests, or a high school
diploma, violated Title VII because the requirement screened out a
"markedly disproportionate number of Negroes."121 The test/diploma
requirement was a prerequisite for employees seeking to transfer from
labor or coal-handling departments to higher paying "inside" depart-
114. In Grant v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 635 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452
U.S. 940 (1981), the court explained: "The employer's burden of proving job-relatedness... is
greater than its burden of merely showing a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason in response
to a claim of discriminatory treatment. The hard, cold statistical record of impact provides a
stronger circumstantial case of discrimination than a subjective claim of improper motiva-
tion." Id. at 1015.
115. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
116. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982) (non-discriminatory final outcome of selec-
tion procedure does not justify intermediate step with disparate impact); Dothard v. Rawlin-
son, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (if employer proves job-relatedness, the Court considers evidence of a
less discriminatory alternative selection procedure available to defendant); Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (the Court considers showing of less discriminatory alter-
native as evidence that neutral selection device was mere "pretext" for discrimination).
117. Albermarle, 422 U.S. at 425.
118. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430-31.
119. Id. at 431. The operative language in Griggs states: "[t]he touchstone is business ne-
cessity. If an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be
related to job performance, the practice is prohibited." Id.
Although correct interpretation of the business necessity and job-relatedness standards
has sparked considerable commentary, the distinctions are only peripheral to this Comment.
The important distinction here is between the employer's required showing of a "legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason" in disparate treatment and the stricter standard in disparate im-
pact. For the sake of consistency, the Griggs disparate impact rebuttal standard will be labeled
the job-relatedness standard throughout this Comment.
120. Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 425.
121. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 428-29. The 1960 Census showed that in North Carolina, the site
of the Griggs dispute, only 12% of black males had completed high school, while 34% of white
males had done so. Also, the EEOC found that given a battery of standardized tests, similar to
the tests employed in Griggs, 58% of whites passed, versus only 6% of blacks. Id. at 430 n.6.
392 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:375
ments.'2 2 Until 1966, all black employees at the plant had worked "only
in the Labor department where the highest paying jobs paid less than the
lowest paying jobs in the other four 'operating' departments in which
only whites were employed." 12 3 The company instituted the transfer re-
quirements in 1965, the year Title VII took effect; management asserted
that the purpose of the requirements was to improve the general work
force quality.124 However, the Court found that "employees who have
not completed high school or taken the tests have continued to perform
satisfactorily and make progress in departments for which the high
school and test criteria are now used." '125 The Court rejected the em-
ployer's selection devices because they were not job-related: "[A]ny tests
used must measure the person for the job and not the person in the
abstract." 
126
The Griggs Court carefully reviewed the statutory language and leg-
islative history to clarify legislative intent regarding tests. 127 The Court
narrowly interpreted the statute's "professionally developed ability test"
language, which permits discrimination based on tests. 128 Writing for
the 8-0 majority, Chief Justice Burger found that Congress intended to
limit the test exception to tests that are job-related. 129 To support that
view, the opinion cited a Senate memo stating that Title VII "expressly
protects the employer's right to insist that any prospective applicant, Ne-
gro or white, must meet the applicable job qualifications."'13° The Court
found additional support for its interpretation of the statute's test lan-
guage in the EEOC Guidelines. The Guidelines required that tests fairly
measure "the knowledge or skills required by the particular job or class
of jobs which the applicant seeks."' 131 Because the 1964 Act created the
EEOC and authorized it to issue regulations, 132 the Court interpreted the
guidelines as expressing the will of Congress.
133
Underlying the Court's ruling in Griggs was the resolution of a
"question of first impression... concerning the meaning of Title VII"-
122. Id. at 427-28.
123. Id. at 427.
124. Id. at 427, 431.
125. Id. at 431-32.
126. Id. at 436.
127. Id. at 433-36.
128. Id. at 434-36.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 434 (emphasis in original).
131. Id. at 433 n.9 (citations omitted).
132. See supra notes 34.
133. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 434.
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whether discriminatory intent was necessary to violate the statute. 134 The
Court was less than painstaking in citing legislative authority to explain
the statute's purpose. Instead, the opinion announced that the objective
of Congress was "plain from the language of the statute." 135 Congress'
objective, the unanimous decision stated,
was to achieve equality of employment opportunities and re-
move barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identi-
fiable group of white employees over other employees. Under
the Act, practices, procedures or tests neutral on their face, and
even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they
operate to "freeze" the status quo of prior discriminatory em-
ployment practices.
136
This language in Griggs contained the seeds of later disagreement con-
cerning which "practices, procedures or tests" '137 are subject to the job-
relatedness requirement of the disparate impact theory. While the Griggs
Court applied the job-related requirement to objective tests, the language
of the decision may be read to approve a broader application of disparate
impact theory.138 For example, the opinion asserted that Title VII pro-
hibits any "employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes
[and] cannot be shown to be related to job performance .... ",139
Since 1971, the Supreme Court has applied the disparate impact ap-
proach straightforwardly in cases involving objective selection proce-
dures. For instance, the Court has found Title VII violations where
disparate impact resulted from use of height/weight requirements for
prison guards, 1" an intelligence test for paper mill applicants,' 4 ' and a
written examination for potential supervisors.' 42 In addition, the Court
has used disparate impact analysis to uphold one employer's policy of
134. Id. at 428.
135. Id. at 429.
136. Id. at 429-30 (emphasis added).
137. See, ag., Spaulding v. University of Wash., 740 F.2d 686, 707 (9th Cir.) (disparate
impact model was designed to handle specific employment practices not obviously job-related),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036 (1984); Pouncy v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 668 F.2d 795, 800
(5th Cir. 1982) (disparate impact model applies only to specific, nondiscretionary selection
criteria).
138. See, eg., Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1288 n.34 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (disparate impact
analysis applicable to procedures involving subjective judgments of agents' performance), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 2357 (1985); Bethlehem Steel, 635 F.2d at 1010-11 (2d Cir. 1980) (disparate
impact theory applied to haphazard, subjective selection process).
139. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
140. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
141. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
142. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
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rejecting all job applicants who use methadone or narcotics, 143 and an-
other employer's policy of excluding pregnancy from disability bene-
fits.'" The Court reasoned in the narcotics use case that non-user status
was a job-related criterion. 14 - The pregnancy benefits case ended, how-
ever, at the prima facie stage; the Court held that excluding pregnancy
coverage was not sex-based discrimination.'
The Supreme Court addressed the possibility of applying disparate
impact analysis to subjective selection procedures, albeit obliquely, in
Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters 47 and Connecticut v. Teal.I48 The
High Court ruled in Furnco that a firm's policy of refusing to consider
applications at the job site should be evaluated under the disparate treat-
ment model, not disparate impact. 149 In Furnco, three black bricklayers
who applied for work at a company job site were rejected summarily,
while the superintendent continued to seek other bricklayers from refer-
rals and previous employees.' 50 The Court held that the employer's jus-
tification for its referrals-only hiring policy-that it needed bricklayers of
known expertise-was a "legitimate nondiscriminatory reason" under
the disparate treatment model."15 In a footnote, the Court explained that
the McDonnell Douglas approach was appropriate in Furnco because the
latter case did not involve employment tests, particularized job require-
ments, or a pattern or practice of discrimination.1 52
Justice Rehnquist's 7-2 majority opinion in Furnco did not affirm
the district court's finding that the racially neutral policy of not hiring at
the gate had no disparate effect. 3 Nor did the Seventh Circuit, which
reviewed Furnco below, directly address the disparate impact issue.'1
4
Justice Marshall, dissenting in part, argued that Furnco Construc-
tion Company's hiring practices should be evaluated for possible dispa-
143. New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
144. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
145. Beazer, 440 U.S. at 587. Even if plaintiffs' "weak" prima facie showing had created a
clear inference of discrimination, the Court held that defendant's public safety explanation
rebutted the presumption. Id. at 587 n.31. The Court stated that there was no need to reach
the third stage of disparate impact analysis, because the lower court made a specific finding
that defendant had no racial animus. Id. at 587.
146. General Elec. Co., 429 U.s. at 137-38.
147. 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
148. 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
149. Furnco, 438 U.S. at 569, 575 n.7.
150. Id. at 570.
151. Id. at 578.
152. Id. at 575 n.7.
153. Id. at 572-75.
154. Id. at 584 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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rate impact.155 Justice Marshall reasoned that
a practice of limiting jobs to those with prior experience work-
ing in an industry or for a particular person, or to those who
hear about jobs by word of mouth would be invalid if the prac-
tice in actuality impacts more harshly on a group protected
under Title VII, unless the practice can be justified by business
necessity.'
56
The dissenting opinion also noted that the Furnco superintendent's use
of a hiring list, composed exclusively of white former employees, should
be examined on remand for disparate impact.'" 7 Justice Brennan was the
only other Justice to sign Justice Marshall's partial dissent in Furnco.'58
In 1982, four years after deciding Furnco, the Supreme Court con-
sidered a different aspect of disparate impact analysis in Connecticut v.
Teal.159 The plaintiffs in Teal were black female employees who were
passed over for promotion to permanent supervisor because they failed a
written test.160 The test was the first step in a multi-component selection
process; the other components were past performance, supervisory rec-
ommendations and seniority.
161
The Court's central holding in Teal was that a nondiscriminatory
"bottom line" result-such as an overall selection process that promotes
blacks at a higher rate than whites--does not justify inclusion in the pro-
cess of one component with adverse impact. 62 Justice Brennan, writing
for a 5-4 majority, ruled that any component with adverse impact must be
proved job-related under the disparate impact theory. 163 To support its
use of disparate impact theory in Teal, the Court asserted that Congress
"recognized and endorsed the disparate-impact analysis employed.., in
Griggs."' 6 The majority buttressed its holding in Teal by asserting that
Congress, in enacting Title VII, "required 'the removal of artificial, arbi-
trary, and unnecessary barriers to employment' and professional develop-
ment that had historically been encountered by women and blacks as
155. Id. at 583 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
156. Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
157. Id. at 584 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
158. Id. at 581 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
159. 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
160. Id. at 443-44.
161. Id. at 444.
162. Id. at 442. Although the "bottom line" favored blacks, the preliminary exam ad-
versely affected them. The passing rate for blacks was 54.17% while the passing rate for
whites was 79.54%. Id. at 443 n.4.
163. Id. at 445.
164. Id. at 447 n.8.
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well as other minorities." '65  Translating the policy goals-achieving
equal employment opportunity and removing barriers to equality 166 -
into more concrete terms, the Court found that any "'identifiable pass-
fail barrier [that] denies an employment opportunity to a disproportion-
ately large number of minorities'... must be shown to be job-related."'
167
Under that rationale, the other components of the supervisory selection
process in Teal, including the subjective past performance and supervi-
sory recommendation components, must also be proved job-related if
they create an "identifiable pass-fail barrier."' 68
Taken together, the Griggs, Furnco and Teal decisions have created
somewhat confusing guidelines for the scope of disparate impact theory.
The Griggs Court determined that Title VII bars both overt and facially
neutral discrimination, 169 then explained that job-relatedness may justify
discriminatory objective tests.170 In Furnco, the Court held that the Mc-
Donnell Douglas disparate treatment model provided the proper frame-
work to analyze defendant's refusal to consider job site applicants. 171
The Furnco Court suggested (in a footnote) that the Griggs approach is
limited to tests and particularized requirements. 172 Finally, in Teal, the
majority stated that it is not enough to measure results at the bottom
line-adverse impact must also be measured at intermediate "pass-fail
barriers." 173 In Teal, the potential "pass-fail barriers" included subjec-
tive components in the selection procedure. 174 Based on these prece-
dents, it is not surprising that federal district courts and courts of appeals
have been inconsistent in deciding when to apply disparate impact
analysis.
B. Contradictory Circuit Court Interpretations
The circuit courts have arrived at widely varying conclusions as to
whether disparate impact analysis should apply to subjective selection
procedures. 175 Segar v. Smith,176 a 1984 District of Columbia Circuit
165. Id. at 447 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)).
166. Id. at 449 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971)).
167. Id. at 445 (quoting Teal v. Connecticut, 645 F.2d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 1981)).
168. Id.
169. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430, 431.
170. Id. at 431.
171. Furnco, 438 U.S. at 575.
172. Id. at 575 n.7.
173. Teal, 457 U.S. at 445, 452.
174. Id. at 444 (employer considered supervisors' recommendations and past work
performance).
175. See infra notes 179, 193-94 for examples of cases adopting different positions on the
issues of subjective procedures.
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decision, and Pouncy v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America,177 a 1982
Fifth Circuit decision, exemplify the irreconcilable positions that some
circuits have advanced.
In Pouncy, the Fifth Circuit held that disparate impact theory was
not applicable to the overall promotion and classification system,""8 nor
to subjective employee evaluations made by supervision. 179 Pouncy, a
black man who was not selected for promotion, asserted a disparate im-
pact claim based on evidence that Prudential hired blacks at an average
weekly salary lower than whites and promoted them at a lower rate than
their representation in the company work force.18 0 The court rejected
Pouncy's disparate impact claim because "[t]he discriminatory impact
model.., is not.., the appropriate vehicle from which to launch a wide
ranging attack on the cumulative effect of a company's employment
practices. . . . Although some courts have used the disparate impact
model to challenge multiple employment practices simultaneously,...
this is an incorrect use." 8 ' Four other circuits have embraced the
Pouncy court limitation of disparate impact analysis to single, objective
selection devices." 2 However, these four circuits have also ruled the op-
posite way on other occasions.183
Other decisions, such as Segar, reject Pouncy's narrow application in
favor of an expansive use of the disparate impact theory.184 In Segar, the
District of Columbia Circuit found that the Drug Enforcement Agency
(DEA) violated Title VII by discriminating against its black agents,
176. 738 F.2d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2357 (1985).
177. 668 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1982).
178. Id. at 800.
179. Id. at 801. The Fifth Circuit reaffirmed the Pouncy rule concerning exclusion of sub-
jective criteria from disparate impact analysis in Carroll v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 708 F.2d
183 (5th Cir. 1983).
180. Pouncy, 668 F.2d at 799.
181. Id. at 800.
182. In accordance with the Fifth Circuit's Pouncy decision, the Fourth, Eighth, Ninth and
Tenth circuits have held that disparate impact does not apply to subjective selection proce-
dures. Pope v. City of Hickory, 679 F.2d 20, 22 (4th Cir. 1981) (disparate impact model only
applies to specific procedures, usually a criterion for hiring); Harris v. Ford Motor Co., 651
F.2d 609, 611 (8th Cir. 1981) (subjective decision-making system, such as supervisory evalua-
tion of work quality, not the type of practice that can form the foundation of disparate impact
case); Heagney v. University of Wash., 642 F.2d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 1981) (disparate treat-
ment model appropriate where gist of plaintiff's claim is use of subjective or ill-defined crite-
ria); Mortensen v. Callaway, 672 F.2d 822, 823-24 (10th Cir. 1982) (subjective system where
numerous factors were combined to evaluate chemists for supervisory positions does not con-
stitute neutral employment practice amenable to disparate impact analysis).
183. See infra note 194.
184. 738 F.2d 1249.
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under both disparate treatment and disparate impact analyses.1 5
Having found unlawful discrimination under the disparate treat-
ment model, the Segar court did not need to decide plaintiffs' disparate
impact claim. However, the court affirmed the district court finding that
the "DEA's initial [government service] grade assignments, work assign-
ments, supervisory evaluations, ... and promotion process had disparate
impacts on black agents." '186 The Segar court endorsed the use of dispa-
rate impact theory to analyze employment processes involving subjective
components. 18 7 In explaining its view, the Segar court roundly criticized
the Pouncy court's assertion that complainants must pinpoint the specific
cause of any disparate impact.'88 "Such a requirement in effect permits
challenges only to readily perceptible barriers; it allows subtle barriers to
continue to work their discriminatory effects, and thereby thwarts the
crucial national purpose that Congress sought to effectuate in title
V11" 1 8 9
The Segar court specifically endorsed extension of disparate impact
analysis to the subjective selection procedure used to determine agents'
grade assignments. 190 While the DEA contended that the one year "spe-
cialized experience" requirement was objective, the court found that the
requirement comprised mainly subjective elements, making it more sub-
jective than objective. 191 The employer's policy defined "specialized ex-
perience" as experience enabling an agent to demonstrate subjective
assets such as tact, discretion, initiative, resourcefulness and the ability to
gain the cooperation and confidence of others.192 Because "subjective
criteria may well serve as a veil of seeming legitimacy behind which ille-
gal discrimination is operating,"19 the Segar court concluded that it is
proper to measure the "relation of such a [subjective] factor to an ob-
served disparity." '94 Thus, the court concluded that the statistical analy-
sis of disparate impact should include the "specialized experience" factor
as a potential source of discrimination, rather than removing it as a law-
ful reason to distinguish among employees.1
95
Although few courts have attempted as comprehensive a study of
185. Id. at 1288.
186, Id. (citation omitted).
187. Id. at 1288 n.34.
188. Id. at 1271.
189. Id. at 1271-72.
190. Id. at 1288 n.34.
191. Id. at 1275-76.
192. Id. at 1275.
193. Id. at 1276.
194. Id.
195. Id. "The law is clear that a plaintiff's [statistical] proof must account for objective
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Title VII jurisprudence as the Segar court did, six other circuits have
arrived at the same conclusion, that disparate impact analysis should be
extended to subjective selection procedures.' 96 In addition, the four cir-
cuits that have adopted Pouncy's narrow view-that disparate impact is
proper only for single, objective procedures-have adopted the Segar
court view in other cases.
197
IV. ANALYZING SUBJECTIVE PROCEDURES FOR DISPARATE IMPACT
This discussion begins by explaining why subjective employment
procedures are increasingly important. Second, it shows why disparate
treatment analysis should not be the sole model available for challenging
subjective procedures. Third, the analysis outlines the legislative, judicial
and administrative authority supporting disparate impact analysis of sub-
jective procedures. Finally, responding to the valid argument that sub-
qualifications; exclusion of subjective requirements [from use as permissible variables to ex-
plain disparate result] ... is entirely proper." Id. (emphasis in original).
196. Circuits endorsing the District of Columbia Circuit Segar rule, in favor of examining
subjective procedures under disparate impact analysis, are the First, Second, Third, Sixth, Sev-
enth and Eleventh circuits. Robinson v. Polaroid Corp., 732 F.2d 1010 (1st Cir. 1984) (layoff
selection guidelines, including subjective evaluations of employees' knowledge, past perform-
ance and future potential, evaluated for disparate impact); Zahorik v. Cornell Univ., 729 F.2d
85 (2d Cir. 1984) (tenure decision involving subjective peer evaluations upheld under disparate
impact analysis); Coser v. Moore, 739 F.2d 746 (2d Cir. 1984) (prior experience requirements
held to be job-related, justifying disparate impact on women professors and classified staff);
Wilmore v. City of Wilmington, 699 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1983) (fire department promotion sys-
tem, incorporating subjective evaluations, found to have disparate impact on racial minorities);
Green v. United States Steel Corp., 570 F. Supp. 254 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (extended Wilmore,
holding that unguided, subjective hiring process, depending on interviewer's "gut-level reac-
tion" to individual applicants, requires a more specific explanation than defendant's stated
reason-seeking the best qualified people-to rebut prima facie showing of disparate impact);
Rowe v. Cleveland Pneumatic Co., Numerical Control, 690 F.2d 88 (6th Cir. 1982) (rehire
system giving plant foremen unrestricted discretion not sufficiently job-related to justify ad-
verse impact); United States v. City of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415 (7th Cir.) (subjective require-
ments including good character, moral conduct and lack of dissolute habits held to violate
Title VII due to disparate impact on blacks), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977); Griffin v.
Carlin, 755 F.2d 1516 (11th Cir. 1985) (promotion practice with subjective standards subject
to disparate impact evaluation).
197. Hawkins v. Bounds, 752 F.2d 500 (10th Cir. 1985) (United States Post Office promo-
tion system, based on subjective prior "detailing" to upgraded jobs, subject to disparate impact
analysis); Gilbert v. City of Little Rock, 722 F.2d 1390 (8th Cir. 1983) (promotion system
including oral interview and subjective performance appraisal invalidated due to disparate im-
pact), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 972 (1984); Hung Ping Wang v. Hoffman, 694 F.2d 1146 (9th Cir.
1982) (predominantly subjective promotion selection system should be evaluated under dispa-
rate impact theory); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.) (seniority system
limiting promotion to employees with experience in certain, typically all-white departments,
violated Title VII under disparate impact model), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
Even the Fifth Circuit has approved the use of disparate impact for a subjective selection
system. Page v. United States Indus., 726 F.2d 1038, 1046 (5th Cir. 1984).
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jective procedures may not fit neatly into traditional disparate impact
analysis, this Comment proposes guidelines for analyzing subjective
procedures.
Most employment decisions contain some element of subjectivity. 198
Employers justifiably consider subjective, intangible qualities in their hir-
ing, firing, promotion, transfer and performance appraisal decisions'99
because subjective qualities do affect job performance. 200 However, use
of subjective selection systems creates a strong potential for discrimina-
tory results.20 1 The potential for unfair results exists even where the
employer and its decision makers lack discriminatory intent.202 To elimi-
198. R. FEAR, THE EVALUATION INTERVIEW 40 (1958). This classic primer on interview-
ing lists "honesty, loyalty, willingness to work hard, and ability to get along with people" as
"common-denominator traits that are important in practically all jobs." Id.
199. The Supreme Court emphasized that Title VII was not designed to diminish traditional
management prerogatives. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 207 (1979). Employ-
ers may use their discretion to "choose among equally qualified candidates, provided the deci-
sion is not based upon unlawful criteria." Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248, 259 (1981) (emphasis added). See also Nellis v. Brown County, 722 F.2d 853, 860-61
(7th Cir. 1983) (even subjective misjudgments not necessarily the basis for a Title VII claim).
200. See supra note 195.
201. Coates v. Johnson & Johnson, 756 F.2d 524, 543 (7th Cir. 1985) (merit ratings based
on subjective evaluations by white supervisors insufficient to rebut inference of racial discrimi-
nation); Gilbert v. City of Little Rock, 722 F.2d 1390, 1398 (8th Cir. 1983) (decisions based on
subjective criteria must be closely scrutinized due to potential for discriminatory abuse), cert.
denied, 466 U.S. 972 (1984); Lilly v. Harris-Teeter Supermarkets, 720 F.2d 326, 338 (4th Cir.
1983) (management's unbridled discretion tends to confirm inference of discrimination created
by statistical disparities), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 951 (1984); Watson v. National Linen Serv.,
686 F.2d 877, 881 (11th Cir. 1982) (standardless hiring procedure, based on policies that
changed daily and were neither communicated to employees nor followed, found discrimina-
tory); Burrus v. United Tel. Co., 683 F.2d 339, 342 (10th Cir.) (rejection of otherwise qualified
person on subjective grounds entitles plaintiff to inference of discrimination under disparate
treatment theory), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1071 (1982); Nanty v. Barrows Co., 660 F.2d 1327,
1334 (9th Cir. 1981) (subjective requirements that delivery truck drivers be neat, articulate and
personable "present potential for serious abuse and should be viewed with much skepticism");
Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348, 359 (5th Cir. 1972) (promotion and transfer
procedures depending almost entirely on favorable recommendation of foreman are ready
mechanism for racial discrimination).
Cf. Frink v. United States Navy, 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 67, 70-71 (E.D. Pa.
1977) (subjective promotion standards did not violate Title VII where safeguards included two
supervisory appraisals, review of appraisals by a panel, and detailed written instructions for
appraisers), aff'd without opinion, 609 F.2d 501 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 930
(1980).
202. When a candidate's background and reactions "appear to have been similar to his, the
interviewer is presupposed to be biased in favour of him.... Judgment can be warped in this
way without the interviewer being conscious of it." R. PLUMBLEY, RECRUITMENT AND SE-
LECTION 145-46 (1981). Prejudices tend to be directed toward personal characteristics and
immutable qualities such as race and color. Id.
[J]udgments developed in the course of an interview may be affected by factors of
which the interviewer is unaware. All of us are undoubtedly influenced-often with-
out recognizing the fact-by our conceptions of what a criminal, a dilettante, or an
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nate the unintentional variety of unlawful employment discrimination,
application of disparate impact analysis is essential.
Subjective criteria take on added importance when an employer re-
lies primarily on them. Primary reliance on subjective evaluations occurs
in selection of management or professional personnel," °3 and in selection
processes where objective tests are not used. People responsible for selec-
tion of high-level employees typically seek value-dependent qualities such
as aggressiveness, self-confidence, good judgment, tact and ability to in-
honest man really looks like. We build up stereotypes of such people .... If we are
not constantly on the alert, we may base an important interview decision on the
resemblance of an applicant to some preconceived stereotype.
R. FEAR, supra note 198, at 35. Merit ratings, like interviews, may reflect the rater's
prejudices. This is particularly true where only one person does a rating, without training or
written instructions, and where abstract traits rather than concrete behavior are used in the
rating. R. BELLOWS, PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSONNEL IN BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY 396-97 (3d
ed. 1961).
See also Wilmore v. City of Wilmington, 699 F.2d 667, 673-74 (3d Cir. 1983) (exclusion of
blacks from administrative jobs caused by both conscious and unconscious racial bias); Chance
v. Board of Examiners, 330 F. Supp. 203, 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (court found a strong possibil-
ity that white interviewers unconsciously discriminated against blacks and Puerto Ricans),
aff'd, 458 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972).
A large scale example of the possible effects of unintentional discrimination may be found
in the statistics for the United States work force. For example, median weekly earnings for
full-time employees in 1983 were $397 for white men, $253 for white women, $299 for black
men, $231 for black women, $274 for Hispanic men and $209 for Hispanic women. BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 419 (1985).
Although the percentage of the labor force constituted by women increased from 30% to
43% from 1950 to 1982, women's earnings remained constant at approximately 60% of men's.
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 2168, WOMEN AT WORK:
A CHARTBOOK iii, 29 (Apr. 1983). The Bureau of Labor Statistics also reported that "the very
highly paid professional and managerial occupations are still predominately male." Id. at 28.
As of August 1985, 13.5% of white male workers held executive, administrative, and manage-
rial jobs, in contrast to 6.2% of black male workers, 9.7% of white female workers, and 6% of
black female workers at those levels.
The quality of managerial jobs held by non-traditional management personnel presents
another issue for the future. A 1984 newspaper report stated: "Although [blacks] now consti-
tute 3.9% of all managers, 'you'd have a hard time counting a dozen who are heads of divi-
sions . . . .' Minority managers ... are concentrated in staff jobs, such as personnel, public
relations or government affairs-positions that, unlike line jobs, don't usually lead to the inner
sanctum." Hymowitz, Taking a Chance: Many Blacks Jump Off the Corporate Ladder to Be
Entrepreneurs, Wall St. J., Aug. 2, 1984, at 1, col. 1.
203. Stacy, Subjective Criteria in Employment Decisions Under Title VII, 10 GA. L. REV.
737, 737 (1976); Note, Title VII and Employment Discrimination in Upper Level Jobs, 73
COLUM. L. REV. 1614, 1630 (1973). Courts have accepted the use of subjective criteria in
professional, supervisory and academic jobs, if the criteria are fairly and uniformly applied,
and if the system contains procedural safeguards. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW 20 (Supp. 1983). See, e.g., Sweeney v. Board of Trustees, 569 F.2d
169, 176 n.14 (lst Cir.) (judicial tolerance of subjective decisions seems to increase with the
complexity of the job), vacated on other grounds, 439 U.S. 24 (1978).
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spire others.21 In middle management positions, organizational psy-
chologists assert that "interpersonal skills" constitute the single most
important prerequisite for success on the job.20 5 Whatever subjective
qualities an employer seeks, the extent to which a candidate possesses
them depends on the perceiver's viewpoint. 20 6 Thus, subjective evalua-
tions are crucial in determining who moves up the organizational ladder,
and whether traditional outsiders may join the ranks of the upwardly
mobile.
Similarly, subjective evaluations gain importance where objective
tests are absent or downplayed. In response to Griggs and the EEOC
Guidelines, a large proportion of American companies reduced or com-
pletely abandoned the use of objective tests "rather than undergo the risk
and expense of compliance."2 °7 While reducing the risk of discrimina-
tion due to culture bias, reliance on subjective evaluations creates new
risks. Even conservative employment discrimination scholars concede
that "the widespread jettisoning of tests may well cut both ways in its
effect on fair employment, by sacrificing objectivity and magnifying the
opportunity for subjective bias to express itself."20
However, commentators differ as to whether test use is decreasing
or increasing in the 1980S.209 Some industry observers indicate that test-
204. R. FEAR, supra note 195, at 41-42. See also INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH UNIT, WHAR-
TON SCHOOL, UNIV. OF PA., MANPOWER AND HUMAN RESOURCES STUDIES No. 8, THE
OBJECTIVE SELECTION OF SUPERVISORS 75-76 (1978). This empirical study of firms in eight
different fields found that four criteria were consistently sought in supervisory hopefuls: ability
to get along with people, job knowledge, leadership and initiative. Id.
205. Kiechel, The Managerial Mind Probe, FORTUNE, Feb. 7, 1983, at 114.
206. Experts in organizational behavior observe that corporate leaders commonly select key
subordinates based on the subordinates' perceived sharing of their own values and styles. P.
HERSEY & K. BLANCHARD, MANAGEMENT OF ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR: UTILIZING
HUMAN RESOURCES 142 (4th ed. 1982).
The usual process is to measure the values and styles of the top management and
then select new people who are compatible with those patterns. The assumption is
that if those people got to the top, their values and styles must be what are needed to
be successful in the organization.
Id.
207. A. LARSON & L. LARSON, supra note 26, § 75.22, at 15-7 (citing Wall St. J., Sept. 3,
1975, at 1, col. 6). In 1975, 36.5% of 2500 companies surveyed did no testing at all. Among
the 63.5% of employers that did use tests, 75% had reduced their testing and 14% planned to
eliminate tests completely. Id.
208. Id. § 75.23, at 15-8.
209. Some reports assert that testing, particularly psychological and personality testing, has
virtually disappeared. R. PRESTON, EMPLOYER'S GUIDE TO HIRING AND FIRING 84 (1982);
A. LARSON & L. LARSON, supra note 26, § 75.22, at 15-8.
Others indicate a continuing decline in test use by American employers, from 90% in
1963 and 42% in 1976 to 33% in 1983. Lookatch, Alternatives to Formal Employment Testing,
PERSONNEL ADM'R, Sept. 1984, at 112. "Title VII has made testing more costly and, thus,
has led firms, even nondiscriminating firms, to use it less." Rothschild & Werden, Title VII
January 1987] DISPARATE IMPACT THEORY
ing is on the upswing after a steep decline in the 1970's.2 I But even
these observers note that employers are using tests more cautiously than
in the past, basing their final decisions on a combination of objective and
subjective evaluations. 211 Because test results no longer merit automatic
deference, employers place heavy reliance on subjective criteria.
Federal courts have consistently applied motivation-based disparate
treatment theory to disallow unlawful bias hidden behind subjective deci-
sions.212 The treatment approach is appropriate where the circumstances
suggest covert discriminatory interest, or abuse by prejudiced deci-
sionmakers. However, the disparate treatment model will not ferret out
discrimination if subjective procedures cause an unintended adverse
impact.
A. Shortcomings of Disparate Treatment Theory
Federal courts often apply a careful scrutiny standard in analyzing
subjective procedures under the disparate treatment model.21 3 Such
and the Use of Employment Tests: An Illustration of the Limits of the Judicial Process, 11 J.
LEGAL STUD. 261, 279 (1982).
Reports concluding that tests are making a comeback include Silas, Fit for the Job?,
A.B.A. J., July 1984, at 34; Brown, Employment Tests: Issues Without Clear Answers, PER-
SONNEL ADM'R, Sept. 1985, at 44, 56.
One survey of 49 companies found that 90% still used tests, although 82% had stopped
using certain tests due to validation difficulties. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY ADVISORY COUNCIL,
EMPLOYEE SELECTION: LEGAL AND PRACTICAL ALTERNATIVES TO COMPLIANCE AND LIT-
IGATION 207, app. a (E. Potter ed. 1983).
210. "We're seeing a cautious return to testing." Brown, supra note 209, at 44. "Businesses
are increasingly interested in quantitative selection procedures." Bacas, How Companies Avoid
Mistakes in Hiring, NATION'S BUS., June 1985, at 34.
211. Bacas, supra note 207, at 35. "[E]mployers ... are coming to terms with the reality
that such [workplace] tests bring problems with their promise .... But used with care, and in
intelligent balance with other selection techniques, tests can be powerful tools for the human
resource manager." Brown, supra note 206, at 56.
212. See, e.g., Lujan v. Franklin County Bd. of Educ., 766 F.2d 917, 931 (6th Cir. 1985)
(use of subjective evaluation of "excellent record" and "enthusiasm" to justify selection of
white coach over black coach approved under disparate treatment theory); Miles v. MNC
Corp., 750 F.2d 867, 874-76 (1 lth Cir. 1985) (disparate treatment found where supervisor said
company did not hire blacks because "they ain't worth a s-"); Colon-Sanchez v. Marsh, 733
F.2d 78, 81 (10th Cir.) (selection based on quality of technical experience decided under dispa-
rate treatment), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 181 (1984); Whatley v. Skaggs Cos., 707 F.2d 1129,
1134-35 (10th Cir. 1983) (demotion of Hispanic due to "lack of business sense," in subjective
evaluation of supervisors, tested under disparate treatment approach); Heagney v. University
of Wash., 642 F.2d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 1981) (disparate treatment model appropriate where
gist of claim is use of subjective criteria).
213. See, e.g., Lujan v. Franklin County Bd. of Educ., 766 F.2d 917, 930 n.19 (6th Cir.
1985) (subjective criteria subject to careful scrutiny); Grano v. Department of Dev., 699 F.2d
836, 837 (6th Cir. 1983) (subjective evaluations subject to particularly close scrutiny when
evaluators are not members of protected minority group); Nanty v. Barrows Co., 660 F.2d
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scrutiny is appropriate because subjective decisions "provide a ready
mechanism for discrimination, permitting prejudice to affect and
often control promotion and hiring decisions.
' '114
Even with the use of a strict scrutiny standard, disparate treatment
theory contains three notable shortcomings when used to analyze subjec-
tive selection procedures. First, the plaintiff's prima facie burden of
showing that he applied for a job, met job qualifications, and was re-
jected, is made more difficult and complicated by the nonexistence of
such data or its unavailability to the plaintiff."'
Second, the defendant's intermediary burden of articulating a legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision is essentially standardless
as applied to subjective reasons. z16 Because the defendant, to meet its
intermediary burden, need not convince the court that its reason is
true,2 17 any subjective explanation that could be legitimate may, in the-
ory, suffice.218 Acceptance of the subjective explanation moves the anal-
1327, 1334 (9th Cir. 1981) (remanded for exacting scrutiny of employer's reliance on "neat,
articulate and personable" requirements); Parson v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 575
F.2d 1374, 1387 n.28 (5th Cir. 1978) (citing Bolton v. Murray Envelope Corp., 493 F.2d 191,
195 (5th Cir. 1974)) (significance of statistical disparities magnified when management deci-
sions subjective), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 968 (1979).
214. Rowe v. Cleveland Pneumatic Co., Numerical Control, 690 F.2d 88, 93 (6th Cir.
1982).
215. Where informal, subjective procedures are the norm, employees seldom know of op-
portunities for promotion or transfer until after the fact. Someone who is considered for a new
position may never find out that he or she was not chosen. Because of the importance of access
to employer records for such evidence, the Supreme Court endorsed shifting the burden of
proof to the employer in pattern or practice cases. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 359-60 n.45 (1977). The burden of proof, however, does not shift to the
employer in individual disparate treatment cases, so the complainant must identify and obtain
access to relevant records in order to succeed.
For a discussion of the data problems associated with challenging subjective procedures,
see D. BALDUS & J. COLE, STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION 25-29 (Supp. 1985).
Baldus and Cole suggest that the plaintiff's prima facie proof requirements should be lightened
where "there are no data available to the plaintiff on applicants .... In such cases, justice calls
for an adjustment of the plaintiff's usual burden since he or she is not responsible for the lack
of data." Id. at 27.
216. See, e.g., Lee v. Conecuh County Bd. of Educ., 634 F.2d 959 (5th Cir. 1981) (employer
using wholly subjective procedure to judge employee qualifications cannot successfully defend
against charge of discrimination by claiming general lack of qualifications).
217. "The defendant need not persuade the court [at this stage] that it was actually moti-
vated by the proffered reasons." Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,
254 (1981). See also Board of Trustees v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 25 (1978) (no need for defend-
ant to prove nondiscriminatory reason, just to offer it); Furneo Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438
U.S. 567, 578 (1978) (reason offered should bear reasonable relation to "some legitimate
goal").
218. But several courts have rejected subjective explanations: Wilmore v. City of Wilming-
ton, 699 F.2d 667, 675 (3d Cir. 1983) (explanation that whites promoted due to "superiority"
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ysis to the final "pretext" stage, when the court must decide which party
to believe. Unfortunately, the parties' explanations of what happened
may be so far apart that they give the court little help in determining
whether discrimination occurred. For example, a black man could claim
that racial prejudice caused his non-selection, after he was interviewed
for an advertising agency account executive position. This unsuccessful
applicant might testify that several agency employees, including the in-
terviewer, did "double takes" when he walked in, and that the whole
interview process lasted less than fifteen minutes. On the other hand, the
interviewer could offer a nondiscriminatory, subjective explanation, such
as the applicant's lack of a sufficient vocabulary to handle clients effec-
tively. In such a fact situation, the court would have to determine
whether the interviewer's reason were true. Whether the reason made
sense in light of the job applied for would be a factor in the court's deter-
nuination, but whether the interviewer actually relied on that reason
would be central.
Several circuit courts have evaded the difficulties of evaluating the
"legitimacy" of employers' subjective explanations by holding that sub-
jective explanations are per se insufficient to rebut a prima facie showing
of discriminatory intent.2 19 Because this approach presumes-incor-
rectly-that subjective decisions are inherently unfair, it is unjustifiably
harsh. If the employer's only explanation for distinguishing between em-
ployees/applicants is subjective and that explanation is summarily re-
jected, the court finds intentional discrimination without reaching the
final "pretext" stage of the disparate treatment model. A better ap-
proach, one that numerous courts have taken, is to view subjective deci-
sions suspiciously and to require specific, clear explanations of the
discredited); Payne v. Travenol Laboratories, 673 F.2d 798 (5th Cir.) (employer's explanation
of hiring "best qualified" insufficient), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1038 (1982).
On the other hand, several courts have accepted subjective explanations to rebut plain-
tiff's prima facie case: Coser v. Moore, 739 F.2d 746 (2d Cir. 1984) (state university success-
fully argued good faith to overcome statistics showing male-female pay disparity); Zahorik v.
Cornell Univ., 729 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1984) (subjective tenure decision lawful absent procedural
irregularities, anecdotal evidence of bias, or defendant's failure to present evidence); Burrus v.
United Tel. Co., 683 F.2d 339 (10th Cir.) (subjective decision that accountant lacked interper-
sonal skills needed for supervision accepted), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1071 (1982).
219. See, e.g., Watson v. National Linen Serv., 686 F.2d 877 (1lth Cir. 1982) (lack of rea-
sonably objective hiring standards tantamount to discriminatory procedure); -Fisher v. Procter
& Gamble Mfg. Co., 613 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1980) (discrimination inferred from subjective
standards with disproportionate impact), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1115 (1981); Baxter v. Savan-
nah Sugar Ref. Corp., 495 F.2d 437 (5th Cir.) (promotion system dependent on unguided,
subjective evaluation of supervisor patently illegal under Title VII), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1033
(1974).
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employer's purpose aid methods.22 °
The third shortcoming of disparate treatment theory stems from the
motivation-based nature of the model. Courts only find disparate treat-
ment violations when an employer fails to offer any legitimate justifica-
tion at the intermediary stage221 or when a plaintiff convinces the court
that an employer's true motive was discriminatory.222 Therefore, dis-
crimination will go undetected under disparate treatment if the defend-
ant innocently employs subjective procedures with disproportionate
effects. The likelihood of perpetuating past discrimination through well-
intentioned subjectivity is great because individual decisionmakers often
fail to recognize their biases. For instance, interviewers may have a ster-
eotyped mental picture of what a manager should look like-a well-
groomed, slender white male-and no one else will match that image.223
Similarly, expectations about proper speech, eye contact and body lan-
guage may block the advancement of newcomers to the American work
place.
These shortcomings outweigh the possible benefits of restricting Ti-
tle VII challenges of subjective procedures to disparate treatment. The
disparate treatment approach should not be the only method of testing a
subjective procedure for discrimination.
B. Authority for Extending Disparate Impact to Subjective Procedures
Congressional inaction, Supreme Court rulings,2 24 the Uniform
220. "[D]efendant's explanation of its legitimate reasons must be clear and reasonably spe-
cific." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 258. See also Grano, 699 F.2d at 837 (subjective promotion deci-
sion not illegal per se, but subject to particularly close scrutiny); Mohammed v. Callaway, 698
F.2d 395, 401 (10th Cir. 1983) (employer's reliance on subjective distinctions to justify choos-
ing non-minority candidate over minority with greater objective qualifications supports infer-
ence of discrimination); Lamphere v. Brown Univ., 685 F.2d 743, 748 (1st Cir. 1982) (citation
omitted) (clarity and specificity required to rebut prima facie showing); Loeb v. Textron, Inc.,
600 F.2d 1003, 1012 n.5 (Ist Cir. 1979) (employer's vague, general avowals of good faith insuf-
ficient-plaintiff cannot challenge employer's reasons unless reasons articulated with
specificity).
221. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254. "If the trier of fact believes the plaintiff's evidence, and if
the employer is silent in the face of the presumption, the court must enter judgment for the
plaintiff." Id.
222. Id. at 258.
223. Id. "[Tihe WASP manager is, of course, a man.., clean limbed and neatly button-
down collared .... His preferred religion is Presbyterian, Baptist or Lutheran .... even
Catholicism may be OK if it is not made too much of." J. KELLY, ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV-
IOR 143 (3d ed. 1980). Along with this tongue-in-cheek description of the stereotypical WASP
manager, the author notes seriously that stereotypes often attach to people of different ethnic
groups. Id.
224. See infra text accompanying notes 228-42.
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Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures,225 and the statute itself 226
support the use of disparate impact theory to evaluate subjective employ-
ment procedures. Since 1972, when Congress amended Title VII, that
body has taken no action on the unintentional discrimination standard
developed by the judiciary. Meanwhile, federal courts have decided
many cases under the Griggs approach.227 Thus, it is highly unlikely that
Congress is collectively unaware of judicial Title VII interpretation.
Congressional inaction in response to fifteen years of disparate impact
decisions provides a strong indication of congressional approval of the
model.
Supreme Court rulings provide more specific support for applying
the Griggs approach to subjective procedures. Authority for this conclu-
sion begins with Griggs itself, where the Court asserted that any "prac-
tices, procedures or tests" with adverse impact must be proved job-
related.228 Nowhere in Griggs did the Court limit the scope of its adverse
impact rule to objective screening devices.229 Because no subsequent
Supreme Court decision has clearly limited the reach of Griggs,23° it re-
mains the cornerstone of disparate impact jurisprudence.
In Connecticut v. Teal,231 the Supreme Court noted that Congress
had approved the Griggs decision's motivation-neutral disparate impact
approach in enacting the 1972 amendments to Title VII.232 The Teal
Court also focused on the analysis presented to Congress to explain the
1972 amendments. The analysis specified that "[iun any area where the
new law does not address itself, or ... where a specific contrary intention
is not indicated, ...the present case law as developed by the courts
would continue to govern the applicability and construction of Title
225. 43 Fed. Reg. 38,295, 38,312 (1978) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (1985)).
226. See infra text accompanying notes 250-53.
227. See supra notes 116, 199.
228. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971).
229. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit recently observed that "[tihe Court in
Griggs did not differentiate between objective and subjective barriers, and, in fact, the court
made frequent references to 'practices' and 'procedures,' terms that clearly encompass more
than isolated objective components." Griffin v. Carlin, 755 F.2d 1516, 1524 (1 1th Cir. 1985).
230. In 1976, the Court issued an opinion surpassing Griggs with respect to a broad reading
of Title VII's purpose: "[I]n enacting Title VII .... Congress intended to prohibit allpractices
in whatever form which create inequality in employment opportunity." Franks v. Bowman
Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763 (1976) (emphasis added). For additional discussion of statu-
tory purpose, see infra text accompanying notes 237-42.
231. 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
232. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 447 n.8 (1982). "That [1972 legislative] history
demonstrates that Congress recognized and endorsed the disparate-impact analysis employed
by the Court in Griggs." Id.
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VII."' 2 "3  Congress evidenced no disapproval of the Griggs approach in
the 1972 Act; in fact, the Act expanded rather than contracted the scope
of Title VII.
2 34
The Teal decision indirectly strengthens the view that disparate im-
pact analysis may be applied to subjective procedures. The Court ruled
that any "identifiable pass-fail barrier" with adverse impact must be jus-
tified as job-related. 2 " While the adverse impact in Teal was caused by
an objective part of a multi-component selection process, the majority
never suggested that its "pass-fail barrier" rule should be limited to ob-
jective procedures.236
One leading commentator has erroneously interpreted Furnco Con-
struction Corp. v. Water 2 37 to establish the general principle that subjec-
tive procedures never involve the "neutral factors" required for disparate
impact analysis.2 38 This view is erroneous because it reaches far beyond
the Court's actual holding. Furnco primarily clarified the proper method
of conducting a disparate treatment inquiry.239 Employing the McDon-
nell Douglas disparate treatment approach, the Supreme Court ruled that
the Seventh Circuit exceeded its authority by devising a new hiring pro-
cedure for the defendant. 240 The Court held that an employer can rebut
the inference of intentional discrimination by offering a "justification
which is reasonably related to the achievement of some legitimate
goal. ' 241 Thus, the central holding of Furnco concerned only intentional
discrimination. The Court explained its reason for using disparate treat-
ment analysis in Furnco in a footnote: "This case did not involve em-
233. 118 CONG. REC. 7166 (1972).
234. For a comprehensive discussion of Congress' awareness and approval of the Griggs
approach in the 1972 amendment process, see Thomson, The Disparate Impact Theory: Con-
gressional Intent in 1972-A Response to Gold, 8 INDUS. REL. L.J. 105 (1986); Gold, Griggs'
Folly: An Essay on the Theory, Problems, and Origin of the Adverse Impact Definition of Em-
ployment Discrimination and a Recommendation for Reform, 7 INDUS. REL. L.J. 429 (1985)
and Gold, Reply to Thomson, 8 INDUS. REL. L.J. 117 (1986). See supra notes 80-86 and
accompanying text.
235. Teal, 457 U.S. at 445.
236. To the contrary, the majority read the pertinent statutory language and the Griggs
methodology broadly: "The statute speaks ... in terms of limitations and classifications that
would deprive any individual of employment opportunities." Id. at 448 (emphasis in original).
"When an employer uses a non-job-related barrier... and that barrier has a significant adverse
effect on minorities or women, then the applicant has been deprived.. ." Id.
237. 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
238. A. LARSON & L. LARSON, supra note 26, § 76.33, at 15-85.
239. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 569 (1978). "We granted certiorari to
consider.., the exact scope of the prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas and the nature
of the evidence necessary to rebut such a case." Id.
240. Id. at 576-77.
241. Id. at 578.
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ployment tests,... or particularized requirements such as... height and
weight specifications."242
Unfortunately, the Court offered no rationale for the difference it
found between Furnco and the test and particularized requirements
cases. One possible distinction is that tests and requirements screened
applicants for substantive abilities and characteristics, while Furnco's no-
hiring-at-the-gate policy was only a procedural requirement. However,
such a distinction is not very useful to persons who are injured by proce-
dural requirements. Another possible explanation for the distinction is
that the hiring policy was subjective while tests and requirements are
objective. However, that distinction fails because Furnco's policy left no
subjective discretion to the superintendent; he could not hire anyone at
the gate. The policy was as facially objective as the tests and require-
ments that the Court attempted to distinguish. Thus, Furnco does not
support any principle regarding subjective selection procedures.
Unlike recent Supreme Court decisions, the Uniform Guidelines on
Employee Selection Procedures243 unambiguously support the view that
disparate impact theory extends to subjective procedures. 2' The Guide-
lines prohibit "[t]he use of any selection procedure which has an adverse
impact on... members of any race, sex, or ethnic group... unless the
procedure has been validated in accordance with these guidelines.... "24 5
"Selection procedures" are defined broadly to include casual interviews,
probationary periods and work experience requirements.246 Many proce-
dures explicitly included in the Guidelines involve subjective
judgments.247
The current (1978) Guidelines were based on court decisions-pri-
madly Griggs248-and were "intended to be consistent with existing
law."'249 These Guidelines were issued two months after the Supreme
242. Id. at 575 n.7.
243. 43 Fed. Reg. 38,295, 38,312 (1978) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (1985)).
244. See supra notes 83-94 and accompanying text.
245. Guidelines, § 1607.3.A.
246. Id. § 1607.16.Q (1985).
247. "Selection procedures include the full range of assessment techniques," including pro-
bationary periods, work experience requirements and unscored application forms. Id.
248. The Guidelines' basic disproportionate impact principle relies on the Supreme Court's
Griggs and Albemarle decisions. Adoption of Questions and Answers to Clarify and Provide a
Common Interpretation of the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 44
Fed. Reg. 11,996 (1979) [hereinafter Questions and Answers]. The Guidelines' general founda-
tion in court decisions is stated at 29 C.F.R. § 1607.2.B (1985).
249. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.2.B (1985).
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Court decided Furnco.2 s° Nonetheless, the Guidelines called for very
broad application of the Griggs disparate impact approach. Clearly, the
issuing agencies (EEOC, Department of Justice, Department of Labor
and Civil Service Commission) did not read Furnco to provide authority
for restricting disparate impact to tests and particularized requirements.
Instead, the agencies characterized Furnco as a case "where there was no
adverse impact," thus only involving disparate treatment.25'
While the EEOC Guidelines have changed considerably since their
first appearance in 1966, the statutory provisions defining unlawful em-
ployment practices have remained the same. Section 703(a)(2), the pro-
vision that Griggs and its progeny construed to establish the disparate
impact model, still states, as it did in 1964, that an employer may not
"limit, segregate or classify his employees or applicants" in any manner
that would "tend to deprive" an individual of opportunities "because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. '252 Unlike
section 703(a)(1), which bars employers from discriminating directly be-
cause of someone's protected characteristics, 253 section 703(a)(2) focuses
on the deprivation caused by the employer's action.25 4 Title VII's lan-
guage supports the view that subjective selection procedures may be in-
validated due to adverse impact. The statute's proscription against
limiting, segregating or classifying employees does not specify how an
employer might do so. It is the effect-being deprived of opportunity or
otherwise adversely affected-not the means, that creates a Title VII vio-
lation under section 703(a)(2).2 5
On the whole, there is a wide range of legislative, judicial and ad-
ministrative authority for extending disparate impact theory to subjective
procedures. The potential benefits of furthering Title VII's equal em-
ployment opportunity goal outweigh any practical difficulties the courts
may encounter.
250. The Guidelines were issued August 25, 1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 38,290 (1978); Furnco was
decided June 29, 1978.
251. "Where there is no adverse impact, the Furnco principle rather than the Albemarle
principle is applicable." Questions and Answers, supra note 246, at 12,004.
252. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1982). See supra note 2 for complete text.
253. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1982).
254. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(2).
255. Id. The Teal Court distinguished between the two code sections, stating that if
§ 703(a)(1) (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l)), stood alone, it "might support exclusive
focus on the overall result." Teal, 457 U.S. at 448 n.9. However, the Court concluded that
§ 703(a)(2) (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2)) encompasses claims against intermediary
procedures with adverse impact. Teal, 457 U.S. at 448-49.
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C. Proposed Guidelines to Analyze Subjective Procedures Under
Disparate Impact Theory
Impracticality is the most persuasive argument against extending
disparate impact theory to subjective procedures. Although disparate
impact theory may in theory encompass subjective procedures, no defini-
tive guidelines demonstrate how courts should conduct such analysis, or
how employers can differentiate between lawful and unlawful subjective
selection procedures.256
Unlike objective selection devices, subjective ones are often charac-
terized by ambiguous starting dates, unknown numbers of candidates,
and few written records. Therefore, opponents of expanded disparate
impact analysis, such as the court in Pouncy v. Prudential Insurance Co.
of America, assert that disparate impact challenges to procedures other
than objective screening devices are too ambiguous, forcing employers to
justify entire employment systems.257 Yet in Segar v. Smith, the court
dismissed this concern, based on the employer's superior knowledge of its
procedures.258 When an employee identifies a subjective selection proce-
256. Schlei and Grossman have compiled a 13-item list of factors useful in evaluating the
legality of subjective appraisal systems. The factors include presence of a job analysis, specific
guidelines for raters, firsthand knowledge by raters of candidates, job announcements, level of
discretion, and appeal mechanism. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINA-
TION LAW 202-05 (2d ed. 1983).
"[A] problem with allowing disparate impact challenges to... discretionary systems is
the difficulty of demonstrating the impact of the individual selection criteria involved... ." D.
BALDUS & J. COLE, supra note 212, at 26-27.
See also Case Comment, Bazemore v. Friday: Salary Discrimination Under Title VII, 99
HARV. L. Rv. 655, 666-67 (1986). While suggesting that the Bazemore court should have
applied the disparate impact model to a charge of discrimination in discretionary assignments
of salary levels and granting of raises, the commentator observed that "[e]ven if the Bazemore
court had applied adverse impact analysis, it is unclear how the court would have resolved the
case." Id. at 667 n.81.
257. The statistics... show that, on the whole, blacks are overrepresented in the lower
levels of Prudential's work force. But this might result from any number of causes.
Absent proof that the disparate impact is caused by one or more of the challenged
employment practices, we do not require the employer to justify the legitimacy of any
(or all) employment practices.
Pouncy v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 668 F.2d 795, 801-02 (5th Cir. 1982). The practices
attacked by Mr. Pouncy were the job level system, unannounced transfer/promotion system
and subjective performance appraisals. Id. at 801.
258. Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2357
(1985). The Segar court determined that employers' inherently greater knowledge of their
practices, and of how those practices affect employees, justifies placing the burden of pinpoint-
ing the cause of a disparity on the employer. Id. See also D. BALDUS & . COLE, supra note
218:
When ... lack of data limits the plaintiff's ability to prove [the disparate im-
pact's] source, the plaintiff's burden of proof should be satisfied with proof of overall
disparate impact .... [Tihe burden should then fall to the defendant .... This
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dure, such as a classification or promotion system, that adversely affects
his protected group, courts should require employers to explain the pur-
pose of that procedure, not their entire employment system. Courts pre-
sume that employers have some rational basis for their actions; 259 hence
an employer's inability to articulate details concerning a procedure with
disparate impact serves as evidence of discrimination.260
This Comment proposes a revised model of disparate impact analy-
sis for subjective procedures, aimed at achieving a fair allocation of bur-
dens, and providing courts with sufficient, organized information. The
proposed model presumes a class action. It begins with a five-step proce-
dure for establishing a prima facie case of disparate impact. Under this
proposed model, the plaintiffs would:
1. Allege membership in a group protected by Title VII;
2. Identify the job category affected by the alleged disparate
impact;
3. State the time frame during which the discriminatory effect
occurred (this should not be a "snapshot," but a reasonable pe-
riod under the circumstances);
261
4. Identify the subjective (or partially subjective) procedure
responsible for the disparate result. Examples include hiring,
approach places the burden of proof on the party with the best access to the data
needed to resolve the causation issue.
Id. at 27.
259. Furnco, 438 U.S. at 577. "[W]e know from our experience that more often than not
people do not act in a totally arbitrary manner, without any underlying reasons, especially in a
business setting." Id.
260. See, eg., Watkins v. Scott Paper Co., 530 F.2d 1159 (5th Cir.) (absence of evidence on
what criteria used in supervisory ratings was fatal flaw in validation study), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 861 (1976).
261. This factor will depend on whether the employer's personnel decisions are cyclical (as
in a school district) or unscheduled. Where selection decisions are made on an as-needed basis,
one at a time, it may take years to generate meaningful statistics. However, the statute of
limitations for filing an EEOC complaint is 180 days from the alleged wrongdoing. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(e) (1982). Complainants might have to undertake substantial research to generate
meaningful statistics. One court held, though, that the relevant time frame was the one begin-
ning 180-300 days before the first challenged action. EEOC v. Local 14, Int'l Union of Operat-
ing Eng'rs, 553 F.2d 251 (2d Cir. 1977).
On the other hand, where the employer makes a large number of decisions at one time,
such as at the beginning of every school year, the results of a single iteration of the process may
be statistically useful. See, eg., Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 309-11
(1977).
Another factor to be considered in selecting the appropriate time period for statistical
analysis is pre-Title VII discrimination. Statistics from before 1965 for private employers, and
before 1972 for public employers, are not dispositive evidence of post-Act unlawful discrimina-
tion. Id. at 309 n.15.
DISPARATE IMPACT THEORY
job assignment, promotion, layoff and transfer procedures; 262
and
5. Present statistics indicating the number of people evaluated'
under the challenged procedure, the percentage of applicants
from their protected group who emerged successfully, and the
percentage of successful applicants from the most-selected
group.
To support a prima facie case, the disparity in selection rates should
be statistically significant2 63 under the following principles. First, if the
procedure involves internal selection only, and the employer openly an-
nounces the selection process and the minimum qualifications, only ob-
jectively qualified applicants should be included in the figures." 4
However, if the internal procedure is not openly announced, then all ob-
jectively qualified and available employees must be included in the "rele-
vant labor pool." Use of a hypothetical pool of potential applicants is
262. The purpose of this factor is to focus the case on a discrete selection process. The
process should be one that plaintiff can identify without extensive research or discovery. It
should also be identified clearly enough to notify defendant of what is being challenged.
Procedures that operate amorphously, or that employ unstated subjective criteria, should
be challenged under this pattern of proof. A subjective system's "very vagueness makes the
fairness of its application dificult to assess on a decision-by-decision basis," hence necessitating
disparate impact analysis. Green v. United States Steel Corp., 570 F. Supp. 254, 274 (E.D. Pa.
1983).
For discussions of logical and equitable reasons to test multicomponent and discretionary
(subjective) procedures under disparate impact, see D. BALDUS & J. COLE, supra note 215, at
25-28; Willborn, The Disparate Impact Model of Discrimination: Theory and Limits, 34 AM.
U.L. REv. 829-32 (1985). Willborn contends that difficulties of proof do not justify immuniz-
ing nonspecific criteria from disparate impact challenge: "Excluding nonspecific employment
criteria from disparate impact analysis because of manageability problems, however, is like
eliminating mathematics from the curriculum because it is too difficult." Id. at 830.
263. Most courts find statistically significant disparity in one of two ways. One method is
the statistical theory that finds evidence of non-accidental causes where there is a "standard
deviation" greater than two or three (normal for accidental results) between expected and
actual outcomes. See Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 308-09 n.14, 311 n.17; D. BALDUS & J. COLE,
STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION 47-48 (1980).
The second method finds statistical significance when there is a ratio of less than four-
fifths between the protected group's selection rate and the selection rate of the most successful
group (successful in terms of selection). The four-fifths rule is found in the Uniform Guide-
lines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4.D (1985). A step-by-step demon-
stration of how to use the four-fifths rule appears in Questions and Answers, supra note 246, at
11,998.
264. A corollary purpose of Title VII is to force employers to bring employment practices
into the open. Trout v. Hidalgo, 517 F. Supp. 873, 883 n.33 (D.D.C. 1981), aff'd, 702 F.2d
1094 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
For discussions of how to define the "relevant labor pool" for internal promotions, see
Rivera v. City of Wichita Falls, 665 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1982); Fisher v. Procter & Gamble
Mfg. Co., 613 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1980).
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necessary to obtain a fair ratio of those selected versus those available,
when protected group members lack the opportunity to apply.26 Simi-
larly, for selection procedures open to both current employees and out-
siders, the relevant labor pool for selection rate statistics would be
comprised of actual applicants, unless the vacancy was unannounced.
Also, where an employer's history of discrimination is likely to discour-
age applicants from the protected group, the statistics should include all
qualified persons in the appropriate geographical area, to correct for a
pro-employer statistical bias when few or no protected group members
are considered.266
If plaintiffs present sufficient evidence to complete the five-point pro-
cedure outlined above, courts should find a prima facie case of disparate
impact. At that point, the defendant may rebut the inference in two
ways.2 67 First, defendant may offer its own statistics and demonstrate
that these are more credible than plaintiffs'. Second, defendant may jus-
tify the challenged process by explaining how it measures job-related
abilities.
If defendant offers only statistical evidence and the court finds plain-
tiffs' statistics more credible, the plaintiffs prevail. On the other hand, if
defendant's statistics refute plaintiffs' statistics, the analysis ends for lack
of a prima facie case. Usually, though, defendants will augment their
statistical defense with proof of job-relatedness.
To prove that a subjective selection procedure seeks job-related
qualities, the defendant should thoroughly explain the nature and pur-
pose of the challenged procedure. The defendant's evidence should ad-
dress these major issues: specific qualities sought;268 connection of those
qualities to job performance; 269 ranking of qualities, if any;270 sex, race
265. One court required a greater statistical disparity where actual rather than potential
applicants are counted, because the "qualified and interested" pool fails to account for those
discouraged from applying by expected exclusion. Townsend v. Nassau County Medical
Center, 558 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1977).
266. Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 310-12.
267. Segar, 738 F.2d at 1267-68; Pouncy, 668 F.2d at 800 n.8.
268. Judicial suspicion of vague subjective decision making is equally appropriate in dispa-
rate impact as in disparate treatment analysis. For cases demonstrating this point, see B.
SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 254, at 202 n.51.
269. See, e.g., Grant v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 635 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1980) (steel construc-
tion foremen qualifications included productivity, leadership, and safety consciousness, but
extent to which haphazard selection process identified these qualities was dubious), cert. de-
nied, 452 U.S. 940 (1981).
270. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 254, at 203. "In the absence of assigned
weights, comparative judgments between candidates with different skills become subject to
whim .... " Id.
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and ethnicity of evaluators;271 training or guidance for evaluators; 272 and
review/appeal procedures available.273
In considering the evidence, the court should give little credit to
employers seeking completely subjective qualities, such as "good atti-
tude" and "ability to fit in." On the other hand, the court should place
more value on relatively measurable capabilities such as writing skill,
oral communication ability, technical knowledge and related experience.
In its evaluation, the court should consider the means by which
evaluators are informed of the qualities sought, and the relative impor-
tance of each quality. Lack of information and training for evaluators
would indicate that the espoused "procedure" is really a vacuum bearing
the loosely given label, "procedure."'274 Similarly, evidence that the
plaintiffs' protected group, and/or other protected groups, are unrepre-
sented among the evaluators would weigh against the employer, and vice
versa. Finally, the availability of a review/appeal procedure, initiated
either by upper level management or by the aggrieved parties, would
favor upholding the employer's procedure as lawful.
Additionally, defendants may offer other relevant evidence to illus-
trate how the subjective selection procedure is job-related. If the defend-
ant can justify its procedure as job-related, the inquiry should conclude
with a decision upholding the procedure as lawful. The "less discrimina-
tory alternative" stage is unnecessary in the proposed analysis because
such an inquiry is used to determine whether the defendant is using sub-
jective procedures unfairly, arbitrarily, or without serious effort. In such
a case, the proper mode of analysis would be disparate treatment, with
the court deciding whether the subjective procedure was a pretext for
intentional discrimination.
The practicality of the proposed subjective procedure guidelines
may be tested by applying them to an actual case. For instance, in Grant
271. The presence of minorities and women in the ranks of the evaluators weighs against a
finding of discrimination. See, e.g., Fisher v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 613 F.2d at 545-46
(discrimination found where no black ever served as assessor in promotional assessment pro-
cess); James v. Stockham Valves & Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977) (white supervi-
sors often gave blacks low "productivity" ratings), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1978).
272. The lack of training or consistent guidelines tends to corroborate rather than rebut an
inference of discrimination. See, e.g., Watson v. National Linen Serv., 686 F.2d 877, 881 (1 th
Cir. 1982) (company policies appeared to change daily and were not communicated to
employees).
273. Existence of an appeal or review procedure may be evidence of nondiscrimination. B.
SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 254, at 205.
274. See Green v. United States Steel Corp., 570 F. Supp. 254, 274 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (by
decentralizing selection decigions, making them standardless and unreviewed, an employer cre-
ates a setting where discrimination is "most likely to occur").
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v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. 275 the proposed analytical approach would have
supported a finding of disparate impact, which was the result actually
reached in the case. In Bethlehem Steel, black and Puerto Rican iron-
workers filed a class action claiming that the company's foreman selec-
tion procedure caused disparate impact.2 76 The defendant company
permitted its superintendents, all white males, to select foremen at their
absolute discretion. 77 The superintendents generally offered foremen
jobs to acquaintances or recommendees eight to twelve months before a
construction job began, leaving no openings available when the projects
actually began. 78 The plaintiffs in Bethlehem Steel would have made the
proposed five-step prima facie showing as follows:
1. Plaintiffs were members of protected groups;
279
2. They were excluded from foreman jobs;
280
3. The relevant time frame was 1970-75, a sufficient time pe-
riod to minimize the statistical effects of accidents;
281
4. The superintendents' absolute discretion to select foremen
caused disparate impact;282 and
5. Blacks and Puerto Ricans were promoted to foreman at
7.2% of the non-minority selection rate. This rate was derived
by constrasting the number of blacks and Puerto Ricans se-
lected from the employer's work force-/102 or 0.98%-to
the number of non-minorities in the work force selected-125/
916 or 13.6%. The entire work force was used for these statis-
tics because the company did not announce foreman
openings.2
83
After the plaintiffs had established a prima facie case, the burden of
proof would shift to the defendant to prove its procedure was job-related.
Under the proposed considerations for proving job-relatedness, the quali-
ties the employer sought were definitely useful characteristics for con-
275. 635 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1980).
276. Id. at 1012.
277. Id. at 1010-11.
278. Id. at 1011.
279. Id.
280. Id.
231. Id. at 1010; see supra note 261.
282. Grant, 635 F.2d 1012. "One superintendent, Driggers, hired his two sons as foremen,
notwithstanding that they had less ironwork experience than the three named plaintiffs and
had not served as foremen before [two of the plaintiffs had]." Id. at 1012.
Superintendent Driggers had "never appointed a black or Puerto Rican [foreman] ....
Although he conceded that some minority ironworkers ... were capable of being forem[e]n, he
... excused his failure [to appoint them] ... on the grounds that he 'didn't know any.'" Id.
283. Id. at 1010.
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struction foremen: leadership, productivity and safety consciousness.284
However, because leadership and safety consciousness are wholly subjec-
tive qualities, their evidentiary value for the employer was limited. The
fact that the hiring superintendents were all non-minority males285 also
weighed against the subjective procedure. In addition, there was no
showing that the company provided superintendents with training or in-
struction to ensure their understanding of the selection standards.286
Moreover, there were no review/appeal procedures available for ag-
grieved persons. Based on these facts, Bethlehem Steel's evidence would
have failed to rebut the ironworkers' prima facie case, so the court would
have found a Title VII violation.
The proposed evaluation procedure, applied to the facts of Gilbert v.
City of Little Rock,287 produces a less certain result. In Gilbert, eleven
black police officers charged that the city police department's promo-
tional system operated to exclude blacks from higher-level positions.288
Once a year, the department created a ranked list of promotion candi-
dates based on composite scores from a written test, an oral interview, a
performance appraisal, the chief's rating and seniority.289 Promotions
were made in order from the list as vacancies arose.29 °
The complainants in Gilbert would have succeeded in making a
prima facie case of disparate impact under the proposed procedure. Be-
tween 1975 and 1979, only one of fourteen black officers was promoted, a
7.1% selection rate, while 25 out of 201 other, non-black officers became
sergeants, a 12.4% rate.2 91 The rate for blacks was 57.2% of the rate for
others, a dramatic difference.2 92
284. Id.
285. Id. at 1011.
286. The company had prepared a "Guide to Equal Employment Opportunity" which it
incorporated into certain contracts. However, the evidence was unclear as to whether the
company complied with the provisions of the Guide in performance of those contracts. Id. at
1012.
287. 544 F. Supp. 1231 (E.D. Ark. 1982), aff'd in part, rev'd and remanded in part, 722
F.2d 1390 (8th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 466 U.S. 972 (1984).
288. Gilbert, 722 F.2d at 1393.
289. Id. at 1395-96.
290. Id. at 1396.
291. Id.
292. For explanations of statistical significance see Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 311 n.17; Cas-
taneda, 430 U.S. at 496 n. 17. The Hazelwood Court observed that precise calculations, such as
those measuring standard deviation, are not absolutely necessary to legal analysis. 433 U.S. at
311 n.17. However, the Court emphasized that choice of an appropriate labor pool for use in
statistical analysis was essential. Id. at 312 n.17.
In Gilbert, the relevant labor pool was clearly identified, because the promotional system
was internal; thus, a 57% disparity in success rate by race provided a strong indication of non-
random results.
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The defendant's job-relatedness evidence could have rebutted the
prima facie case, exonerating the police department. The personality
traits evaluated in the oral interviews were performance under stress,
ability to reason, ability to work harmoniously with associates, presenta-
tion of a forceful public image and social skills.293 These qualities seem
related to a police sergeant's job, yet their extremely subjective nature
weighs against the employer.294 Similarly, the facts that all the inter-
viewers were police captains,295 and that no black had been promoted to
lieutenant (the rank immediately below captain),296 supports a finding for
the complainants.
On the other hand, the fact that defendant provided interviewer
training and an appeals procedure might tilt the scales in its favor. The
personnel department trained the five interviewing captains to evaluate
candidates using an objective rating system.297 Also, the police chief re-
tained final responsibility for supervising the interview process. 298 Fi-
nally, the availability of a formal appeals procedure through the city civil
service commission, 299 would support the employer's case.
The court's judgment, based on these facts in Gilbert, would depend
on whether the court viewed the safeguards as sufficient to overcome the
possibility that discrimination tainted the subjective procedure. Thus,
the proposed guidelines will not always provide certainty. They will,
however, make the plaintiff's prima facie case sufficiently unambiguous
to inform the employer as to which procedure is being challenged, and
require the employer to explain its procedures thoroughly. The goal of
the proposed procedure is not to outlaw subjective selection procedures,
but rather to ensure that employers monitor their subjective selection
practices to prevent abuse.
V. CONCLUSION
Employers need freedom to consider intangible qualities in making
personnel decisions. However, subjective evaluation processes-such as
interviews and appraisals that rate personal qualities-offer a strong po-
tential for discriminatory abuse because they give decisionmakers broad
293. Gilbert, 544 F. Supp. at 1249.
294. Gilbert, 722 F.2d at 1398.
295. Gilbert, 544 F. Supp. at 1249.
296. Gilbert, 722 F.2d at 1396.
297. Gilbert, 544 F. Supp. at 1249-50.
298. Id. at 1249.
299. Id. at 1234.
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discretion. Decisionmakers who do not recognize their own prejudices
may abuse that discretion unintentionally.
In order to curtail the unlawful use of subjective procedures, federal
courts should apply both disparate treatment and disparate impact ap-
proaches. The disparate treatment approach should be employed where
a complainant alleges that an employer intentionally used subjective pro-
cedures to mask discrimination, or passively allowed managerial employ-
ees to indulge their prejudices.
The disparate impact model should be employed where the com-
plainant does not allege improper intent. Unintended discriminatory re-
sults may survive indefinitely due to lack of awareness of their cause.
Such results should be scrutinized under the stricter "job-relatedness"
standard of disparate impact analysis. If federal courts would uniformly
adopt this approach, employers would gain new incentive to examine
their subjective procedures, ensuring that those procedures focus on job-
related skills. Unlawful employment discrimination would then take a
significant step toward extinction.
Susan Melanie Jones*
* Special thanks to James Keyte for his thoughtful guidance, and to Loyola Professor
Marcy Strauss for reviewing the final draft.
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